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Introduction 
 
Why is it so important to raise the issue of globalization for Russia and her regions? Despite 
the underdevelopment of Russia’s version of globalization, the international community in 
general and specific foreign countries in particular do have their impact on internal 
developments in Russia. Sometimes the effects of globalization are not visible enough, but 
they cannot be disregarded. In spite of his inward-oriented rhetoric, President Putin’s federal 
reform launched in May 2000 to some extent was inspired by developments outside Russia. 
These were the foreign investors who were confused by the tug-of-war between the federal 
center and the regions, and who called for a reshuffle of the federal system in Russia to avoid 
conflicts between federal and regional laws and get rid of regional autarchy. What is also 
telling is that Putin intends to implement his federal reform in accordance with formal 
democratic procedures, keeping in mind Western sensitivity to these issues. 
 
The shift of power from the center to the regional actors was the major development in 
Russian politics in the beginning of the 1990s. Yet the Russian regions are not equal players 
on the international scene. Not all of them are capable of playing meaningful roles 
internationally, and these roles can be quite different for each one. 
 
Three groups of constituent parts of the Federation ought to be considered as the most 
important Russian sub-national actors in the international arena. The first group comprises 
those regions with a strong export potential (industrial regions or those rich in mineral 
resources[1]). The second group is composed of ethnically non-Russian republics. The third 
group includes borderland regions.  
 
Only regions belonging to either of these groups: a) might have sufficient resources for 
challenging the federal foreign policy and designing its own long-term strategic routes in the 
world; and b) demand more powers in foreign-related issues. Their strategies contrast with 
those of inward-oriented (“introvert”[2]) regions seeking more protectionism from the central 
government and more state control over import and export operations. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show that globalization in Russia develops in a peculiar 
environment, which is different from that in the West. In this paper the discourse about 
Russia’s way to globalization will be placed into the Russian domestic context. The aim will 
be to demonstrate that: 
 
- first, subnational territorial units in Russia are gradually becoming international actors; 
- second, globalization of Russia’s regions is a very uneven and competitive process; 
- third, this unevenness and competitiveness might bring both new opportunities and 
challenges for Russia.  
 
More specifically, the ambition of this paper is to analyze those different models of trans-
border cooperation in which Volga Federal District (VFD) is engaged. These patterns largely 
coincide with the search for international profiles of three subjects of federation that are 
located in the VFD: a) Nizhny Novgorod oblast, which is a good example of industrial region 
located in Russia’s heartland; b) Tatarstan whose international capital is very much related to 
ethnicity and cultural and religious revival; c) Orenburg oblast which is an illustrative 
example of border region located at the edges of civilizations. 
 
 
 
Part 1.  
“THE POWER VERTICAL” AND THE HORIZONTAL NETWORKING: 
COMPETING STRATEGIES OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTEGRATION FOR NIZHNY NOVGOROD OBLAST 
 
 
From the very beginning of Putin’s presidency, integration became the most widely used 
concept of Russia’s regional development. It is hard to question the need for domestic 
institutional integration, which is justly considered to be the precondition for Russia’s 
survival in 21st century. What is still debatable are specific models of integration and their 
relevance to the challenges of globalization.  
 
By the end of 1990 it became clear that due to emergence of new political, economic and 
public actors Russian political space became much more complex than ever before. New 
patterns of institutional and non-institutional interaction were coming into being, with new 
corporate actorship to emerge on the basis of new labor ethics. These new trends were very 
much consonant with the world-wide crisis of hierarchical models of organizations and 
mushrooming of networking managerial models, which in Russia have however their own 
specificity.  
 
Regions’ survival in increasingly complex and demanding environment consisting of a 
variety of actors depends on how they are to be positioned in the frameworks of both 
horizontal cooperation and vertical subordination. Traditionally, the regions in Russia were 
perceived as administrative units looking for their room in the “administrative staircase” of 
political power. Vertically, the regions are parts of what could be called “administrative 
market” composed of political institutions each having its niche in newly reconstructed 
“vertical of power”. Yet this is just one part of the story, since the regions increasingly find 
themselves interacting with other structures and institutions that in a strict sense are not a part 
of “administrative market” and are not attached to specific territory to the extent the regions 
are. Horizontally, the regions have to discover the potential of coalition building with other 
“sovereignty-free actors” (James Rosenau’s wording). What became important is social 
interaction with other members of regional milieu, interchange of resources and information, 
coordination of political and social practices, combination of different experiences[3]. 
 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (NNO) is a good example of changing roles of the regional 
governmental and non-governmental institutions under the pressures of globalization. NNO 
has always had far-reaching international ambitions (Nizhny Novgorod Fair historically was 
an important international trade point; nowadays the NNO government has launched a project 
of turning the region into one of leading Eastern European cultural centers). This case study 
shows that it is impossible to achieve international goals and reach world standards by relying 
on purely administrative measures. Globalization is basically about networking between 
equal partners horizontally associated by mutual interests. 
1.1. Networking Strategies of NNO Actors 
 
There are four types of key regional actors in NNO that widely apply networking strategies. 
First, these are industrial and business institutions. To foster domestic cooperative links 
between small and medium enterprises, a number of associations were established like 
“Partniorstvo” (“Partnership”), “Delovaya Perspektiva” (“Business Perspective”) and others.  
 
For business community, creating technological and productive chains is an important asset. 
For example, “NORSI” oil company, one of most successful enterprises in NNO, builds its 
strategy on closely cooperating with oil reprocessing factories located in Kstovo and 
Dzerzhinsk, and “Sibur-Neftekhim” corporation[4]. Insurance companies (both local and 
Moscow-based) also develop business networks in NNO using a variety of means like e-
trade, Internet advertising, etc. 
 
International networking strategies are also widely applied to make NNO business actors 
better integrated into the world markets. NBD Bank, one of largest in NNO, is a part of a 
number of cooperative projects to include overseas partners such as World Bank and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Nizhny Novgorod Commodities & 
Currency Exchange has initiated “Investment in Russia” project with special focus on Volga 
Federal District territories.  
 
The second group are educational and scholarly institutions. Among those actors developing 
the conceptual framework for networking strategies and implementing them in practice are 
Center for Social and Economic Expertise, Nizhny Novgorod Research Foundation, Nizhny 
Novgorod Regional Fund for Personnel Training, and other non-governmental public policy 
research institutions.  
 
University community in NNO is one of few “islands of globalization”. It was the Institute 
for Applied Physics, Russian Academy of Science, that gave start to “Sandy”, the first 
electronic network in Nizhny Novgorod. “Intel” corporation has developed its educational 
programs in information technologies in Nizhny Novgorod State University. High School of 
Economics has launched a pilot project in human resources management and business 
education. The head of “Yukos” company has started major educational project “Generation” 
to compete with Soros Foundation and its regional branches. 
 
The third group of networking actors are NGOs working in the public policy domain. 
Environmentalists (“Dront” center), human rights associations and gender organizations are 
among the most influential public actors in NNO. Thus, the International Forum “Great 
Rivers” that is periodically convened in Nizhny Novgorod, frames discussions around wide 
range of problems of national interest - from environment to Caspian Sea oil extraction. 
 
The fourth group are information actors. Thus, TUS Information Center is committed to the 
mission of reshuffling region’s communication space on the basis of new information and 
managerial technologies. Nizhny Novgorod branch of Moscow-based Sterling Group is the 
region’s leader in inculcation of state-of-the-art technologies of corporate decision making, 
personnel retraining and strategic planning[5]. Internet business (including web design, e-
commerce, and communication technologies) is mushrooming in the region. Strategic goal of 
these actors is to make information work for the sake of commercial and managerial 
efficiency. 
 
The fifth group are ethnic, religious and cultural actors that tend to develop their outward 
strategies regardless of administrative and territorial borders. Cultural exchanges are about 
networking by definition, they develop beyond state and administrative borders. 
 
These five groups very much differ from each other – for example, the first group is 
composed of self-oriented actors, while all other groups actors are of strong public interest 
background. Each of them possess of different types of capital as shown in the table 
below[6]: 
 
 
 
4. Information actors Intellectual capital (data possession and 
distribution, interpretation of key events)
5.  Ethnic and religious actors Cultural capital (cultural knowledge that ultimately 
redounds to the owner’s advantages
2. Educational and scholarly institutions Human capital (trained skills, know how, 
expertise)
3. Public policy NGOs Social capital (socialization, relationship)
Networking actors: Type of capital:
1. Industrial and business institutions Financial and physical capital (economic assets, 
funds, material property)
Thus, networking strategies are not exclusively based on market, profit-seeking principles, 
and include important social dimensions (information sharing, education, use of intellectual 
capital and know how, appearance of joint values and shared ethics, interlacing of 
responsibility, etc.). The networking relations are primarily about mutual agreements, 
including informal ones, and trust. In comparison to market operators, networking actors do 
refuse to apply strategies that would undermine the interests of their partners (see table 
below).  
 
 
 
The objects of exchange are well fixed in legal 
terms
What is exchanged is experiences and values
Sanctions against deviant actors are based on 
litigation mechanisms
Sanctions are a part of social relations and are based 
on moral and ethical standards
Market Strategies Networking strategies
The main objective is material gain The main objective is establishing long-term 
cooperative communications with multiple partners
 
Establishing networking relations is a time consuming process, which makes participation in 
the network more effective that withdrawal. In this sense, networking successfully combines 
two different principles – competition and cooperation. Its effectiveness might be explained 
in terms of facilitating access to key resources and knowledge, lowering the risks, and 
speeding up innovations. By and large, networking leads to growing integrity within specific 
social and economic segments, be it business community or the world of NGOs. Most likely, 
in the future networking will flourish in those sectors which defy both market selfishness and 
administrative regulation[7]. 
What matters is that these are basically networking actors that foster liberal agenda and 
institutional pluralism in NNO. Many of them are in the vanguard of region’s global moves, 
since their practices and experiences seem to correlate with the “global networking” concepts 
being developed and widely implemented in the West in the last decades. Foreign 
investments predominantly go to those sectors which are based on networking principles and 
are relatively free of excessive administrative regulations[8]. This was one of basic messages 
of US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neil who has visited NNO in August 2000[9].  
 
Of course, in order to avoid oversimplification, we should not treat absolutely all actors given 
in categories above as strong promoters of globalization agenda in the region. For example, in 
media and University communities of NNO we can easily find nationalistic and protectionist 
attitudes[10]. A significant part of regional business elite is ostensibly critical to joining 
WTO because of the fear to loose competition with strong international contenders. For 
example, anticipated entry of Russia in WTO will eventually make the insurance companies 
to increase their capital assets, which will automatically push many of small regional 
companies out of the market.  
 
Yet despite these reservations and fears, the very nature of non-governmental actors 
operations makes them a part of global networking. They are pioneers of what could be called 
community based development initiatives (including education, project support, technical 
assistance, and institution building) that promote open society agenda and democratic 
institution building in the region[11]. Lobbying, grassroots activity, public relations, 
litigation, mass communication and contributing to political campaigning constitute the core 
of networking strategies. To the extent that networking actors influence government officials, 
they make them more accountable and responsive[12]. The networking actors are in most 
cases the leaders of public opinion, making specific demands upon government 
representatives on behalf of identifiable interests in the society. They are modifiers of 
members behaviour and opinion, and vehicles by which interest groups can realize their 
political, economic and social goals, both inward and outward oriented[13]. 
 
Most of networking actors are more efficient and resourceful in comparison to their 
administrative counterpart. For example, private TV channels in NNO are more popular than 
the state-owned. Business managers are generally perceived as more trustful that the local 
Kremlin politicians[14]. 
 
In a very indicative way, the public activity of networking actors is not always applauded in 
Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin, and frequently receives negative administrative feedback. 
Horizontal networking might become a matter of security concerns for regional officials. For 
example, in summer 2001 the NNО administration has issued a warning statement identifying 
those “non-traditional” religious units that are considered to be detrimental for the region’s 
stability, with Ron Habbard’s Scientology Church on its top[15].  
 
Lots of regulations are being imposed by regional public authorities in response to the 
perception that the networking sector is in violation of the public good[16]. Nizhny Novgorod 
Human Rights Society was heavily criticized for its peace initiative in Chechnia, while 
“Dront” ecological center got negative media coverage for allegedly making money on 
ecological concerns and impeding some industrial projects in the region[17]. Nizhny 
Novgorod Association of Soldiers’ Mothers failed to get City of Nizhny Novgorod (CNN) 
Duma support to conduct a referendum aimed at introducing non-military service as an 
alternative to current conscript. All this leads us to take a closer look at a different segment of 
region’s political and economic milieu which is the “administrative market”. 
 
 
1.2. Administrative Strategies and Their Actors 
 
Administrative channels are a different type of strategy applied by regional actors. The 
totality of these channels form peculiar “administrative market” to include a variety of 
official institutions each having its predetermined and well fixed place in the hierarchy of 
state power. 
 
Levels of Partnership 
 
- Municipal level. In the cities, foreign programs are targeted on strengthening local 
administration of social assistance. In VFD, the Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.) and the 
Institute of Urban Economics (Moscow) under the USAID-supported program have 
implemented two pilot projects of this kind – in Perm (with the key purpose of assisting the 
jobless in finding employement) and Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod oblast(school lunch 
project[18]). 
 
- Regions (subjects of federation). The basic problem at this level is to find the right balance 
between supporting the NGOs and cooperating with regional authorities. Thomas Carothers 
deems that it is important to incite Russian civil society institutions to find common 
background with governmental organizations. However, at least two major problems loom 
large at this point. First, many of Russian regions are semi-authoritarian political regimes, 
which complicates the perspectives of communication between public officials and 
NGOs[19]. Second, as Stephen Holmes suggests, the double control (as soon as the grant 
recipients are supposed to be accountable to both foreign foundations and domestic 
authorities) might paralize the project implementation[20]. 
 
- Federal district level. FVD is a home to annual Fairs of Social and Cultural Projects 
financed by a number of international sponsors and politically supported by the presidential 
representative Sergei Kirienko[21]. 
 
1.2.1. Federal administrative institutions  
 
The federal center understands that regions have important impact upon federal policy issues. 
The main challenge is to find appropriate strategies and institutions to foster center-regions 
cooperative relations.  
 
Volga Federal District (VFD) established in May 2000 is a major institutional element of 
“administrative market”. On the one hand, the federal district is an instrument for conducting 
coherent federal policies at sub-national level. In an attempt to supervise the regional 
economic developments, Sergei Kirienko, presidential envoy in VFD, has suggested that 
mechanisms comparable to enterprises’ bankruptcy and introducing crisis managers have to 
be applied to the subjects of federation in case of their financial insolvency and 
mismanagement[22]. 
 
On the other hand, Kirienko widely uses the advantages of this new institution to lobby the 
interests of NNO both domestically and internationally. For instance, attending Salzburg 
Economic Forum in 2001, Kirienko has advertised the investment opportunities of NNO[23]. 
 
In the sphere of international relations one of the most important formal institutions is the 
local branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in NNO which was established in 1992 and is 
in charge of visa support and issuing passports for foreign travel. It also assists the tourist and 
travel companies, as well as business institutions wishing to check information concerning 
their international partners[24]. 
 
1.2.2. Regional administrative institutions 
 
During the last decade (1991-2001) NNO has experienced three different types of regional 
governance which could be summarized in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International credentials Good reputation in international financial and political circles
Mediocre, tending to decrease 
by the end of the term in office Almost non-existent
Major rivals in the region Communists and nationalists The mayor of CNN
Liberal groupings, potentially – 
Presidential representative in 
VFD
Major political defeats
Corruption accusations, 
unfinished character of initiated 
reforms
Inability to adequately mitigate 
clashes of interests, failure to 
secure regional budget
Slow team building, low 
transparency of decision 
making procedures
Major political successes
Opening up of the region to the 
world, turning NNO into one of 
most important political regions 
in Russia
Starting to build relations with 
major domestic investors, 
forming the regional 
government
Freezing membership in 
Communist Party
Major political resources Publicity and news making Political apparatus (regional nomenklatura)
Protest voting and Communist 
party affiliation
Relations with non-state 
actors (media, NGOs, etc.)
Very selective, based on 
corporate loyalty and 
administrative interest
Generally tense and 
ambiguous, with multiple ups 
and downs
Unclear (still nascent)
Economic orientations Liberal reforms Stagnation Socially oriented economic platform
Relations with the federal 
center Excellent Unstable and controversial Enforced compromise
Political agenda Democratic and pluralist (right-wing) Conservative (centrist) Left-oriented (pro-Communist)
Type of political regime “Winner takes all” “Struggle by the rules” “Struggle by the rules”
Boris Nemtsov Ivan Skliarov Gennady Khodyrev
 
 
The governorship of Boris Nemtsov (1991-1997) was considered as one of the most liberal in 
Russia. However it was intrinsically based on predominance of administrative instruments 
and measures in political consensus building and economic reforms. Nemtsov’s leadership 
contained strong authoritarian inclinations, since his strategy was that one of subordination of 
the most loyal non-state institutions to the regional authorities, and marginalization of those 
which were treated as uncooperative. Politically, Nemtsov’s leadership was a sort of “one 
man show’, which by and large corresponded to “winner takes all” model of regional political 
regimes developed by Vladimir Gel’man[25].  
 
The governorship of Ivan Skliarov (1997-2001) was a period of political and economic 
stagnation. Skliarov who won the election after Nemtsov’s resignation with the image of his 
follower, lacked clear understanding of the region’s mission and interests. In comparison to 
Nemtsov, his successor stuck to conservative agenda, and in even greater scale preferred to 
heavily rely upon the support of the regional nomenklatura.  
 
Gennady Khodyrev, a Communist who defeated Skliarov in 2001 election, is still in search 
for his regional political identity. He has to oscillate between the loyalty to the federal center 
and his left-wing credentials.  
 
All three types of political regimes experienced in NNO have however much in common. All 
of them were based on overtly administrative strategies of achieving their political goals, and 
underestimated the importance of heeding the needs and interests of non-state actors. All 
three governors were rather suspicious to autonomous roles of financial and information 
actors, and basically neglected their potential. These protectionist instincts are particularly 
visible as soon as it comes to Moscow-based companies wishing to extend their business 
operation to NNO: the practice is that multiple red-tape impediments are being erected to 
push away out-of-region competitors [26].  
 
One of greatest problems of region’s administrative market is that its institutions seem to be 
rather vulnerable to electoral constrains. In Sergey Obozov’s words, this is the governor who 
is the sole guarantor of institutional stability within region[27]. The resignation of right-wing 
Obozov’s government in the aftermath of the victory of Communist candidate Gennady 
Khodyrev in July 2001 gobernatorial election was an evident prove of fragility of political 
and administrative market in the region. 
 
Of course, this is not to say that administrative strategies are doomed in principle. 
Administrative tools might indeed be rather effective in solving a number of issues. For 
example, many in Nizhny Novgorod deem that the whole concept of off-shore zones has to 
be drastically revised. NNO authorities believe that the off-shore zone in Sarov takes monies 
away from the regional budget and is a sort of financial “black hole” which brings substantial 
loses to regional finances[28]. Of course, these are administrative tools that are to be first 
applied to make the enterprises to pay taxes to the regional budget of NNO.  
 
Some of sub-national administrative institutions are rather effective in going global. The Bor 
county administration – which is a part of NNO – is widely known for its well-thought 
strategy of attracting foreign investors (including “Glaverbel”, “Gallina Blanca” and other 
reputed European companies). The Bor administration has pledged to reimburse its foreign 
partners for those losses that were incurred due to bureaucratic procedures and unexpected 
changes in legislation[29]. 
 
1.2.3. Industrial actors 
 
Relations of industrial actors with the administrative institutions are very complex and 
controversial. On the one hand, almost all new owners of major Nizhny Novgorod industrial 
enterprises have been staying aloof of the regional politics. Oleg Deripaska, one of most 
influential Russian tycoons and the owner of GAZ car-building factory, has refused to run for 
governorship in 2001 despite insistence shown by a part of regional elites. Later in his 
interview Deripaska has pointedly refused to give his appraisals to the government of NNO, 
thus demonstrating his unwillingness to get into political and administrative issues. 
 
Yet on the other hand, industrial actors are in one way or another closely associated with 
regional and federal administrative institutions. Regional authorities of course are very much 
interested in keeping control over major plants and factories due to financial (paying taxes to 
regional budget), social (keeping balance in the regional labor market and avoiding large-
scale unemployment) and political (controlling large segments of constituency) reasons. Even 
if regional administration formally is not among stake holders of an industrial enterprise, the 
former has a lot of tools to exert its influence over industrial policies.  
 
Major financial and industrial groups (FIGs) are eager to keep “special relations” with certain 
factions of federal policy making elite. For example, Oleg Deripaska is know for good 
relations with influential people of Moscow Kremlin - it was Anatoly Chubais who was most 
instrumental in making Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to allow Deripaska’s companies 
to take over the Nikolaev Aluminum Works. Moreover, Deripaska badly needs state 
protection from multiple international law suits charging him with money laundering and 
illicit business operations[30].  
 
The very structure of Russian legislation makes the federal authorities indispensable for 
tackling a plethora of most practical issues related to everyday activities of industrial actors. 
Thus, the federal center consent was needed to restructure the debts of “GAZ”[31] and 
establish joint venture GAZ-FIAT.  
 
From its part, under President Putin the federal authorities have developed their own 
strategies towards regional industrial actors. One of them is creating a number of all-Russian 
business associations that eventually would become the backbones of Putin’s “new social 
contract” and the cornerstones of federal center industrial policies.  
 
Another strategy is to make individual firms merging in larger industrial corporations of 
trans-regional reach. According to Kirienko, four sectors were given high priority for NNO 
and VFD in general: petrochemical industry, car building, aviation and transportation[32].  
 
In NNO the pioneers of industrial enlargement were radio-electronic enterprises that in 
summer 2001 have formed three corporations - “Radar”, “Radiopribor” and “ATC”[33]. Each 
of them is supposed to get preferential treatment from the federal government (their debts 
will be restructured, and the federal contracts will be secured). Another most recent example 
of establishing trans-regional vertically integrated company is “Volga Hydro-energy 
Cascade” also created in summer 2001.  
The matter of fact is that appearance of new business agglomerations lessens the political and 
administrative resources of regional “party of power”. As economist Yakov Pappe suggests, 
the possibilities of administrative bargaining decrease, because the specter of issues to be 
solved exclusively by regional administration is shrinking. Should this trend persists, in the 
future the financial and industrial groups will treat regional administration as merely one of 
their counter-parts to deal with. In this case FIGs as coalitions of partner business 
organizations will play major role in Putin’s institutional reforms[34]. 
 
 
1.3. Bridging the Gap Between Administrative and Networking Strategies 
 
The main message of the previous sub-chapter was that administrative strategies have their 
clear functional and institutional limitations. Many efforts of networking actors fade away 
because of multiple administrative institutions each erecting their red-tape barriers. That is 
why for the sake of market efficiency they have to be coupled with non-administrative, 
networking instruments. 
 
 
1.3.1. Region Building in Between Administrative and Networking Principles 
 
Regional administrative institutions develop a wide range of relations with autonomous and 
semi-independent actors. Commercial banks were among creditors of the NNO 
administration[35]. Regional Fund for Supporting Small and Medium Business, affiliated 
with the Oblast’s Department of Developing Entrepreneurship, is a guarantor of the program 
to finance socially important projects initiated by local private companies[36]. One of the 
first moves of Gennady Khodyrev in his capacity of new NNO governor was signing a 
protocol with “Gazprom” corporation in order to reschedule the regional budget’s debts to 
this mighty gas monopoly[37]. 
 
Close interconnectedness of administrative and non-administrative tools might be well 
illustrated by the project of establishing Free Customs Zone (FCZ) “Russia’s Pocket” in 
NNO. It pop up in summer 2001, when the government of NNO has drafted FCZ concept and 
solicited federal center support in issues of taxation and passing appropriate legislation[38]. 
However, purely administrative channels are not sufficient for effective management of this 
ambitious project. Apparently, it is not enough to invest budget funds to those sectors that 
have to take the lead in region’s development. What is necessary is to find appropriate 
business partners that have vested interests in upgrading communication and transportation 
infrastructure, environment, urban architecture, tourist facilities, and other components of 
business friendly climate. 
 
There are other proves of potentially fruitful linkages between administrative (vertical) and 
non-administrative (horizontal) strategies. As soon as Nizhny Novgorod became the main 
city of VFD, regional authorities came up with the idea of “exploiting the resource of the 
capital city”. The point is however that Sergey Obozov, the first head of NNO government, 
treated this resource in predominantly administrative ways: with its new political role as the 
“capital” of the district, Nizhny Novgorod attracts more attention from the part of the 
President, and more ministers come here with official visits[39]. Meanwhile, there are 
competing concepts of Nizhny Novgorod development – that ones of turning it from the 
administrative “district capital” to the “business capital” with market friendly climate, 
entrepreneural culture and business sensitive policy making. 
Basically these were Russian investors – major financial industrial groups like “Sibal”, 
“Interros”, “Severstal”, “LUKOil”, “Kaskol”, “United Car-Building Plants” – that became 
major networking partners of NNO administration[40]. Their advent to NNO market was a 
sequence of their inability to successfully operate abroad due to multiple reasons including 
protectionist policies of Western countries and slow adaptation of Russian FIGs to 
international markets demands. In result, each of these FIGs has purchased major industrial 
enterprises like GAZ, Pavlovo Bus plant, “Krasnoe Sormovo” shipyards, and other 
industrially meaningful plants. Intrinsically, relations within FIGs are usually characterized 
by “soft” coordination of interests between numerous business operators and coalition 
building. For example, in petrochemical industry the new holding is being formed with a far 
reaching strategy of competing with leading international producers. As a precondition for 
entering the world markets, the holding is oriented to keeping high standards in accounting, 
consulting, and securing share holders rights[41].  
 
Inevitably, creation of such corporations will make the regional authorities to rethink their 
old-fashioned strategies of industrial development. There is no longer much room for Soviet-
style orders to industrial actors that are motivated by making money and expanding their 
markets. In case if the business climate in the region is insufficiently friendly, major investors 
might leave the NNO as fast as they have appeared. In response to changing procedural 
framework, administration of NNO has introduced the practice of signing cooperation 
agreements with major investors (“Sibur-Neftekhim” and others), which is a good testimony 
of emerging comprehension of horizontal cooperation strategies in the region. 
 
To boost NNO investment potential, NNO government has to horizontally cooperate with a 
number of autonomous partners to include such NGOs as “Transformation Technologies”, 
“Institute of Commodities Market and Management”, “Expert Institute”, “Institute of Urban 
and Regional Development”, “Institute of Direct Investments”. In Obozov’s words, the role 
of the regional administrative structures is to accumulate resources of private sector for 
launching major cost-sharing projects co-sponsored by foreign and domestic investors. This 
fruitful approach is one of results of the strategy of foreign financial institutions to incite 
regional administrations to raise matching funds for collaborative projects[42]. 
 
Yet not only administrative institutions have to recourse to cooperation with non-state 
economic actors. The latters need positive administrative feedback as well. For example, 
insurance companies operating in NNO are certain that lack of interest to their business from 
the part of local and municipal authorities is one of major deficiencies of insurance market 
progress in the region[43]. 
 
The concept of mixing horizontal and vertical strategies is applicable to political domain as 
well. Politically, the region might secure its interests (both nation-wide and internationally) 
via parliamentary institutions (both chambers - the State Duma and the Federation Council - 
have strong regional backgrounds). Yet those representing the region in the federal 
parliament are members of different political parties and public movements, and in this sense 
are rather participants of various political networks than of administrative hierarchies. 
 
The humanitarian sphere too necessitates constant interaction between administrative bodies 
and non-administrative actors (media, think tanks, voluntary and professional associations, 
etc.). For example, Nizhny Novgorod Law Institute of the Interior Ministry became one of 
partners of U.S. Emerald Group within the framework of the anti-corruption project that 
involves – by the very nature of the problem tackled – public authorities. Similarly, Nizhny 
Novgorod Human Rights Association created in August 2001 by a number of local NGOs 
(Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, Ecological Center “Dront”, Society Against Tortures, and 
others) is looking for nomination of its activists to the VFD Human Rights Commission, 
which from the very beginning was filled basically by administrators[44].  
 
1.3.2. District Building and Changing Strategies of Trans-Regional Actors 
 
The district-building process is a mix of administrative (vertical) and networking (horizontal) 
strategies. Domestically, administrative cadres in VFD are predominantly recruited – due to 
Kirienko’s efforts – through open contests, which gave reason to speak about new principles 
of political management technologies that are being tested in the district and based on using 
communication and information resources. Not incidentally, the bulk of candidates for public 
service offices in VFD come from business[45].  
 
This is an understandable trend because small and medium business is in search for their 
niche somewhere in between administrative market and networking strategies. Nizhny 
Novgorod became the consolidation center of the VFD branch of the All-Russian Union of 
Entrepreneural Associations. On the one hand, this nascent institution is clearly supported by 
the Presidential administration eager to find new communicative channels for state-business 
dialogue. On the other hand, this Union is structurally based on coordination of sectoral and 
territorial interests between multiple business organizations[46]. To foster investments and 
credits, one has to establish a network of connections with international institutions as well.  
 
The big business too is leaning to administrative decision makers. Thus, “Lukoil” company 
purchase of “NORSI” oil processing plant in NNO was negotiated in 2001 under the auspices 
of Sergei Kirienko, as a part of recreating large industrial holdings in VFD[47].  
 
Networking principles are also projected onto those spheres laying beyond Russia’s borders. 
Sergey Kirienko, for example, noted that the territorial area of responsibility of Russia’s 
leaders, both national and sub-national, is defined not by administrative borders but rather by 
cultural factors - he refers to the “area within which people think and speak Russian”[48]. 
Kirienko is known for his commitment to support the networking of non-governmental 
organizations fostering horizontal integration local communities and specializing in culture, 
arts, ecology, social partnership, youth policy, sports, gender. He enthusiastically supports a 
number of cultural projects like “Social Projects Fair”, “Cultural Capital of the District” and 
others. 
 
Interdependence of administrative and networking strategies might be illustrated by the 
changing roles of many actors of trans-regional reach. One of them is the Volga Customs 
Board, one of key institutions in charge of VFD regions’ foreign economic contacts. On the 
one hand, like all other district-level institutions, the Board is an instrument for achieving 
greater centralization and unification of customs operations. On the other hand, it has to find 
out the ways to cooperate with individual exporters and importers, customs brokers, and other 
actors which stay beyond administrative market.  
Here is another example. NNO is a part of “Greater Volga” Association of Inter-regional 
Economic Cooperation. Though Association members are regional administrations, 
organizationally it is based on networking principles. For example, NNO has come up with 
the idea of establishing the Volga Board on Foreign Trade with the mission of coordinating 
and monitoring foreign economic relations of individual regions forming the “Greater Volga” 
Association[49]. This might be done only on the principles of respecting mutual interests and 
equality of all parties involved.  
 
The same goes for extending to NNO the trans-European transport corridor running from 
Berlin through Minsk to Moscow and further eastward. Closely related is the federal program 
“Roads of 21st Century” in which NNO – due to its location at the crossroads of “North-
South” and “East-West” transportation axes - plays one of key roles. Basically, these projects 
are based on administrative background, since these are public authorities that are in charge 
of investing into upgrading the transport infrastructure, including airports, highways and river 
ports[50]. This is responsibility of the regional authorities to find adequate solutions to those 
critical problems that might undermine the project – for example, restructuring huge debts of 
Gorky Railroad, or finding the most appropriate areas of industrial cooperation with failing 
economies of Belarus (within the framework of trans-European transport corridor) and 
Central Asia countries (keeping an eye on potential “North-South” transportation project 
which is still under consideration). 
 
The truth is, however, that administrative strategies sometimes lack due transparency and 
competitiveness. For example, there were many alarming signs that Moscow – Nizhny 
Novgorod highway is mismanaged by NNO authorities, which represents a threat to 
implementation of international transport corridor project[51]. Yet most important is that 
there is much room for non-state actors’ (investors, providers of retail services, travel 
agencies, communication companies, etc.) contribution to the success of each of the projects. 
Transportation upgrading projects in VFD, apart from mobilizing administrative resources, 
clearly require regular horizontal interaction with a wide range of actors relatively 
independent of the regional governments like car producers, catering services, media, etc[52]. 
Hence, the basic challenge for project implementation is due coordination – basically non-
administrative, interest-driven - between multiple actors each having their stakes in upgrading 
transportation facilities.  
 
*** 
 
It is widely acknowledged that Sergei Kirienko, the presidential representative in the Volga 
Federal District, is one of few Russian sub-national politicians who is open to cooperation 
with the Western foundations. In his view, the state is in no position to tackle with all 
emerging troubles, relying exclusively on its own forces[53]. In particular, Kirienko was the 
first of presidential envoys in the federal districts to held an official meeting with Eurasia 
Foundation. One of concrete results of Kirienko’s rapprochement with the Western grant 
making institutions was the project of selecting one of the Volga cities to be its ”cultural 
capital”. The Fair of Social Projects is also one of initiatives of VFD authorities supported by 
foreign foundations. In 2001 IREX has launched special program of partnership between 
VFD-based and American institutions. 
 
Yet it is still debatable whether the NNO has managed to raise its international credentials. 
Learning to live in the world of networking relations (including using communication 
technologies, skilled labor force recruiting, and business education) is a hard challenge for 
region’s political and economic actors. Building balanced cooperative relations is a true 
departure from the Soviet-style decision making, and might bring certain disorientation to the 
decision makers. Thus, the first reaction of Nikolai Pugin, former General Director of “GAZ” 
car-building factory, to the entry of “Severstal” company into NNO market, was extremely 
negative[54]. Pugin has wrongly predicted that new powerful economic actor would 
undermine stability in NNO. The period of relative uncertainty went on with the purchase of 
“GAZ” by another wealthy newcomer – “Sibal” group. “GAZ” also went through 
reconsidering its relations with its major foreign partner “Fiat” and started negotiations with 
“Ford” and “Volkswagen”[55]. 
 
A number of problems are still unsolved in the area of international engagements of NNO 
actors. First, there is a critical deficit of skilled managers in the region. Second, customs 
regulations are outdated and obsolete. Third, foreign investors are not happy with the 
economically all-mighty monopolies like “Gazprom”, RAO EES which might easily raise 
energy tariffs and thus damage existing projects. Fourth, many enterprises are unwilling to 
apply international accounting standards, mainly because they are afraid to loose informal 
financial mechanisms they are used to. Fifth, some of public authorities still are not apt for 
long-term international cooperation. Thus, for example, Swisscontact, Swiss-based 
foundation, had to abstain from funding business incubator in the city of Dzerzhinsk because 
the municipal authorities were unable to timely find appropriate office[56]. Another notorious 
example is much debated conflict between NNO authorities and international investors who 
defended their right to continue erecting the hotel in Nizhny Novgorod downtown despite 
obstruction from the part of local religious and nationalist groups that have found an ancient 
cemetery under the building's foundation.  
 
A very important restrain of region’s strategy of internationalization is that the possibilities 
for establishing and developing networking relations are very much limited. Thus, Pavlovo 
Bus Plant has succeeded in cooperating only with partners from Ukraine and Vietnam which 
became interested in buying its vehicles and providing spare parts for them[57].  
 
 
 
Part 2. 
ETHNICITY AS A RESOURCE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE CASE OF 
TATARSTAN 
 
 
Tatarstan belongs to a different group of ethnically non-Russian republics. Ethnicity is a 
powerful factor that almost automatically pushes those republics into a wider system of 
international and transnational relations[58]. A search for ethnic identity is a factor of 
international socialization of Tatarstan, giving a new quality to their international standing. 
Transnational identity based on cultural heritage, religion, and language can provide a 
network of opportunities for the region’s population or for certain segments of the 
population[59]. For example, some Islamic countries (Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others) assist 
Tatarstan in spiritual and educational affairs, as well as by rendering moral and political 
support[60]. Establishing links with their ethnic diasporas also plays an important role in the 
foreign affairs of this republic.  
 
What is more, ethnic republics usually are eager to position themselves internationally by 
placing special impetus on international legal norms defending ethnic minorities. At the same 
time all of them count on international solidarity in case of encroachment from the federal 
government on their autonomy, since they have both moral and material support abroad 
among like-minded ethnic groups and organizations[61]. 
 
Tatarstan’s ethnic regionalism is geared by the adaptation of international economic 
experience and its projection to specific ethnic backgrounds. Its elites try to thread ethnic 
identity through economic rationality. Ethnicity in this case is used as a resource to foster 
autonomy from the federal center and provide societal consolidation.  
 
In the meantime, the polemics around Tatarstan is focused on core issues for Russia as a 
whole – those of its integrity, cohesiveness and the ability to speak with the single voice 
internationally. This region might also provide useful insights on the limits of Putin’s 
recentralization project.  
 
The case of Tatarstan clearly demonstrates how slim is the line dividing Russia’s domestic 
and foreign policies. Indeed, one of major challenges to Russia is to learn to live with the 
revitalized world of Islam both on Russia’s southern periphery and within its own 
boundaries[62]. Tatarstan is a good illustration of the “intermestic” nature of today’s political 
process and close interrelatedness of its different segments. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Globalization Paradigm as Seen From Tatarstan 
 
On the one hand, President Shaimiev repeatedly underlines that the federal authorities ought 
to be primarily busy with taking strategic positions and defending globally the Russian 
national interests, presuming that the stronger are international engagements of the central 
authorities, the lesser would be their involvement in the plethora of regional issues. 
 
On the other hand, Shaimiev himself strongly adheres to globalization approaches and is in 
no mood to give up the sphere of international relations to the Kremlin. In his words, the 
world consists not of governments but primarily of nations and ethnic groups whose interests 
ought to overweight the interests of states. The concepts of “nations beyond states” and 
“global federalism” are rather popular in Tatarstani ruling circles. Some local scholars deem 
that “national sovereignty of Tatars is more important than the state sovereignty of the 
republic”, since the territory of Tatarstan was fixed arbitrarily, while the Tatar nation is well 
integrated phenomenon[63] (which is not exactly the case since the bulk of Tatars reside 
outside Tatarstan).  
 
As viewed from Tatarstan, globalization gives it direct access to international cultural and 
social milieus. Global norms and institutions are important for Tatarstan since they might 
internationally justify its strategic aspirations for autonomy and self-rule[64]. International 
community, in Shaimiev’s words, is committed to preserving cultural diversity of the 
humankind and defending the rights of each of the ethnic groups. As Rafael Khakim (policy 
aide to Shaimiev) admits, without such internationally accepted values as human rights, 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, and democratic governance, the very survival of Tatarstan 
could have been put under question[65]. 
 
Yet the current state of international law does not satisfy completely Tatarstani leaders. Thus, 
according to Khakim, “pleading the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the 
international community prefers to leave the solution of self-determination problems to the 
discretion of the states involved… The most radical step towards a renewal of international 
relations would be to establish a second chamber of the United Nations, one which would 
represent peoples and not states. This would change the structure of many international 
organizations, including the International Court of Justice”[66].  
 
In his foreign policy President Shaimiev tries to maintain a balance between “West” and 
“East”. Authorities of Tatarstan keep ‘special relations’ with the Muslim countries that focus 
basically on cultural and political issues, while relations with non-Muslim countries are 
mainly aimed at improving economic ties. A good continuation of Tatarstan’s policy of 
balance was the project of restoring the “Great Volga Road” that historically has proven its 
efficacy in connecting the northern and western parts of Russia with Caspian and Black Sea 
ports[67]. 
 
President Shaimiev has pointed out that “Western Europe is the landmark for Tatarstan”. 
Tatarstani leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction with incremental anti-Western attitudes 
among Russian policymakers. At the same time, political and intellectual leaders of Tatarstan 
have repeatedly expressed their disappointment with the Western countries policies. Thus, 
Western-style reforms as implemented by Yegor Gaidar government in early 1990s and the 
shock therapy modeled after American advises were rebuffed in Kazan’. In view of local 
experts, the West sticks to selective support to the human rights by ignoring the bloodshed in 
Chechnia and refusing to recognize politically the separatists[68]. In spite of the Western 
policy of economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein regime, Tatarstan is intensively 
cooperating with Iraq in oil extraction and reprocessing[69]. 
 
Opinion polls in the city of Naberezhnie Chelny had shown that only 10,9% of its population 
would applaud fostering market reforms on the basis of political rapprochement with the 
West. In minds of many Tatars, pro-Western policy attitudes might lead to strengthening of 
Christian influence in the republic[70].  
 
Inside Tatarstan there are more radical foreign policy attitudes (of course, we should not 
exaggerate the political importance of those radical viewpoints for Tatarstan, since the 
governing elite is much more moderate and pragmatic). For example, activists of the “Tatar 
Public Center” (one of nationalist groups) call for boycotting the federal ministries in 
Tatarstan as “institutions of foreign state”[71]. The Kurultai (Convention) of the Tatar People 
appealed to international community claiming that Tatarstan is Russia’s colony (local 
nationalists commemorate October 15, the day when the army of Ivan the Terrible militarily 
subdued Kazan’ in 1552, as national mourning), and has to be allowed full-fledged 
international participation. Among the most radical proposals of the Kurultai delegates were 
stigmatizing inter-ethnic marriages, establishing contacts with national liberation movements 
all across the globe and application for Tatarstan’s membership in NATO[72]. Some radical 
extremists (frequently called “non-traditional Islam groups” backed by likely-minded 
sponsors from Pakistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon and other countries) are 
practically implementing some of those theories – recruiting volunteers for Chechen rebels 
and preparing terrorist attacks[73]. 
 
The table below illustrates some of those divergent assessments. 
 
Sovereignty
Territorial integrity of Russia
Foreign policy
Legal collisions
Citizenship
War in Chechnia
Identity
Diaspora
Ethnicity and democracy
Defending ethnic interests is 
more important than 
democracy
Strengthening ethnic factor is a 
precondition for democratic 
development
Democracy has to be built up 
upon non-ethnic background
All possible methods up to 
military insurgence Negotiations Negotiations
Methods of settling center-
periphery disputes
 Forming global Tatar 
community
Diaspora as a factor 
legitimizing Tatarstan’s global 
bid
Diaspora is basically cultural 
phenomenon
 
Islamic identity
Double identity (European and 
Islamic); Tatarstan as a bridge 
between West and East
Common multi-national identity 
of the whole Russian people
 Tatarstan ought to follow the 
Chechnia drive for 
independence, yet be better 
prepared
Appeal to stop the violence and 
military actions in the 
Caucasus, and start 
negotiations with the Chechen 
leaders
Massive use of military force to 
suppress rebels and terrorists
 
Independent of Russia 
citizenship
Gradual acceptance of double 
(Russian and Tatarstani) 
citizenship
Single Russian citizenship 
(Tatarstan is allowed to issue 
additional inset for its 
residents)
 
Tatarstan ought to have its own 
legal system
Laws of Tatarstan have priority 
over Russian federal legislation 
(as ruled by Tatarstan’s 
Constitutional Court)
Coherency and indivisibility of 
the legal foundations of the 
Russian Federation
 
Completely independent 
foreign policy (up to application 
for NATO membership)
Republic of Tatarstan is the 
state associated with Russia 
(and is equal to Russia), and in 
this capacity is the subject of 
international relations 
Tatarstan’s “foreign 
connections” (as different from 
the “foreign relations” of the 
federal center) are based on 
the treaty of division of powers 
between the regional and the 
federal authorities
 The principle of territorial 
integrity might strain ethnic and 
regional development
Tatarstan does not seek full 
separation from Russia
Territorial integrity is 
unconditional political principle
 Transition from “colonial 
dependency” to full-fledged 
independence which was 
interrupted by Russia’s military 
interference in 1552
Sovereignty is flexible and 
divisible (it might be shared 
between Tatarstan and 
Russian Federation)
Sovereignty belongs to Russia 
as a whole
Issues Radical Nationalists Republic of Tatarstan government
Russian federal center 
authorities
 
 
2.2. Constructing and interpreting the meanings of  sovereignty 
 
The problem of sovereignty is the core issue to understand the ways in which the foreign 
relations of Tatarstan are organized. 
 
The notion of sovereignty - as used by Tatarstan leaders - is however rather vague. 
“Contradictory”, “complicated”, “clouded”, “unsettled”, “murky”, “amorphous”, “confused” 
– these characteristics could be given to Tatarstani-Russian legal collisions. Three blocks of 
controversies might be distinguished in this domain. First, according to the Tatar 
Constitution, this republic is a sovereign state and a subject of international law associated 
with the Russian Federation. By contrast, the Russian Constitution asserts that Tatarstan is a 
subject of the federation and a part of its territory. Secondly, although Tatarstan claims the 
independent right to determine its legal status, Russia contends that the republic’s status is 
defined according to a joint reading of both federal and republican constitutions. Third, each 
constitution provides for the supremacy of its own provisions1[74].   
 
It was former President Yeltsin who first offered self-rule and self-management for Tatarstan. 
Since that time, different interpretations of sovereignty have appeared: “taxation 
sovereignty”, “economic sovereignty”, “double sovereignty”, “shared sovereignty”, 
“distributed sovereignty”, “divided sovereignty”, etc. Most of these intellectual inventions are 
subjects to different interpretations and open for further discussions. None of them should be 
taken for granted, because these are not legal, but basically political issues. 
 
 2.2.1. Tatarstan’s Approaches 
 
From the very beginning there was always a great deal of uncertainty with regard to 
Tatarstani sovereignty. Mikhail Stoliarov, the first deputy of the representative of Tatarstan 
Republic in the Russian Federation, assumes that in the federal state there is no single and 
indivisible sovereignty in the traditional sense, since under federalism there might be 
“cohabitation” of multiple sovereignties, as determined by the voluntary transfers of powers 
between the central and the regional governments2[ Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of the 
State Council of Tatarstan, insists that the relations between Tatarstan and the Russian 
Federation are those between two states3[76]. President Shaimiev himself interprets 
sovereignty as “the right to act autonomously within the framework of proper 
prerogatives”4[77]. In his view, since “it would be too short-sighted to claim for full 
independence”, Tatarstan is ready to accept that it voluntarily becomes a member of the 
Russian Federation and transfers to the federal center the right to decide on such issues as the 
federal foreign policy, war and peace issues, international treaties of the Russian Federation 
5[78]. This is what is baptized by Shaimiev himself as “moderate sovereignty”, that one 
which has neither anti-Russian nor secessionist background, and which even recognizes the 
functions of the federal authorities as “strategic planning”6[79 
 
What we see here is clear mix of legal and political approaches. Legal purity had never been 
the highest priority for Tatarstan7[80]. What was most important is to maintain certain level of 
controversy and even conflictuality with the federal center in order to strengthen its 
bargaining power and find excuses for eventual failures in its own policies.  
 
The durability of all legal irregularities and imperfections mentioned above might be 
explained by the fact that neither of two parts – the federal center and the republic of 
Tatarstan – was interested in establishing clear and transparent mechanism of relationship. 
Both parts were wishing to leave as much room for “under-the-carpet” bargaining and 
personal deals as possible8[81].   
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 It is true that Tatarstan quite succeeded in informally lobbying its interests using a variety of 
political arguments. Not all of them however are in good tune with each other, and almost all 
are open to multiple interpretations. Thus, Shakir Yagudin, the Law Department Chairman in 
the State Council of Tatarstan interprets the legal uncertainties in such a way that this 
republic is “the state within the state”9[82]. Describing its nature, President Shaimiev defines 
it as “the state of all peoples living in our territory”, and simultaneously as “the state of 
Tatars”10[83]. He wants independent powers but pledges not to undermine the unity of 
Russia. Presenting himself as a federalist, Shaimiev opts in fact for the “union state with the 
elements of confederation”11[84]. He is in favor of raising the status of Russian oblasts 
within the federation, but opposes granting the oblasts the same rights as the republics 
enjoy12[85]. In our view, all these statements are based on political symbolism rather than on 
targeting the real issues Tatarstan has to face. 
 
2.2.2. Federal Policies 
 
Not less controversial is the federal center stand. The Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation had ruled that the recognition of the Tatarstani statehood does not necessarily 
imply the recognition of its sovereignty. The statehood, in the Constitutional Court 
interpretation, only reflects certain peculiarities of Tatartan’s legal status, as related to 
historical, ethnic and other legacies. In reference to 1992 referendum, the Constitutional 
Court argued that it was illegitimate to formulate that Tatarstan is the subject of international 
law. 
 
Sergey Shakhray, one of Boris Yeltsin’s top political advisers, uses different explanatory 
markers assuming that having elected their representatives to the State Duma and voted in all-
Russian presidential elections, the people of Tatarstan de facto recognizes the sovereignty of 
the Russian Federation over the territory of Tatarstan13[86]. Shakhray, one of key political 
figures in charge of drafting Moscow - Kazan’ agreement of 1994, reinterpreted “associated 
status” of Tatarstan not in terms of state-to-state relations (as authorities in Kazan’ did) but 
rather as a kind of “natural association” going back to the middle ages. Associated relations 
are treated as those of historical alliance of Tatars and Russians, united organically by the 
very nature of vicinity and multiple communications14[87]. 
As to legal part of the story, according to the Federal Law of January 1999 “On coordination 
of international and foreign economic activity of Russian Federation’s constituent parts“, 
Russian regions can’t sign agreements with foreign central authorities unless Russia’s 
government approves them. This provision formally runs against the power-sharing treaty 
between Russian Federation and Tatarstan. The Constitutional Court of Russia has issued two 
statements on Tatarstan: that ones of 13 March 1992 and 17 June 2000, which indicated – in 
defiance of multiple documents signed between Moscow and Kazan’ - that laws proclaiming 
Tatarstan’s sovereign status were unconstitutional. 
Despite all these inconsistencies from both parties involved, it is important that from the very 
beginning of 1990s sovereignty was seen in Kazan’ as a process to be developed on ad-hoc 
basis. In Shaimiev’s words, “we don’t think the sovereignty is an absolute, neither we push it 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
forcefully in those directions where there is no way to come – for example, in defense or 
financial matters. Should the circumstances change, we shall react”15[88]. Again, this is a good 
example of purely political approach to solving the legal controversy. Rafael Khakim has 
explicitly acknowledged that „we were independent only one day we have proclaimed the 
sovereignty, yet next morning we have started the process of self-restriction”16[89]. Here is 
the core difference between Tatarstan and Chechnia: the former is eager to achieve the “free 
hands policy” within the federation, while the latter was aimed at “running away” from 
Russia.  
 
Tatarstan’s strategy might be called a piecemeal sovereignty. What Tatarstan proposes – and 
the federal center might easily accept - is the set of key points: 
 
 recognition of its partial (limited) sovereignty; 
 further delineation of responsibilities between the republic and the federal center; 
 in case of legal conflicts between the republic and the federal center, priority 
should be given to the legal norms of that party which is in charge of the question 
under consideration17[90].  
                                                          
 
This is exactly the agenda for negotiations between Tatarstan and the federal center under 
President Putin presidency. We are turning to this issue in the next section. 
 
 
2.3. Sovereignty Under Question: Tatarstan within the Context of Putin’s Reforms 
 
Putin’s centralization policy had directly affected Tatarstan in many ways. On June 27, 2000 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had questioned the sovereign status of the 
republic. On June 2001, the Supreme Qualification College of the Judges of Russia has issued 
a warning statement to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Tatarstan Gennady Baranov for 
his failure to fulfill the Russian legislation18[91]. Sergey Kirienko, the presidential envoy in 
the Volga Federal District, has questioned Shaimiev’s ambition to represent the interests of 
all Tatars of Russia (alluding that the majority of Tatars live beyond the republic)19[92]. The 
Customs Board of Tatarstan was rearranged and subordinated to the Volga Customs 
authorities20[93]. Vladimir Zorin, deputy presidential representative in VFD, has challenged 
the abilities of Tatarstani ethnic policies positing that “there are a number of problems that 
the confessions are unable to solve by themselves”21[94], without interference of the central 
government. 
 
In May 2000 with the start of the territorial reform Vladimir Putin has announced that the 
first task of Presidential envoys in the federal districts would be to bring local laws into line 
with the federal ones. The Commission on revising the Tatarstani legislation had started its 
work on September 11, 2000. Initially the deadline was set for December 31, 2000, yet for 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the two republics with the greatest number of laws which didn’t 
conform to federal ones, this period was prolonged up to March 9, 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of legal equalizing turned out to be an uneasy enterprise. Thus, both 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Tatarstan had harshly criticized the appeal of the 
deputy prosecutor general in VFD Alexander Zviagintsev who urged to cancel 40 articles of 
the Constitution of Tatarstan which, in his opinion, contradict the Russian legislation. Yet the 
Russian Supreme Court insists that its Tatarstani counterpart has to take decision on this 
issue22[95]. Moreover, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had stated that the 
most recent election to the State Council of Tatarstan were held with violations of the 
national laws, which in fact questions the legitimacy of the Tatarstani parliament23[96]. 
 
To counter-react, Tatarstani leaders have issued a number of statements. The first reaction to 
Putin’s initiatives was rather furious. For example, Marat Galeev, the member of the State 
Council of Tatarstan, has called the whole federal reform unfeasible and conducive to 
violations of current legislation24[97]. 
 
Yet President Shaimiev has shown more moderation. He expressed his strong support of 
keeping intact the power sharing agreement, alluding that there are no other documents that 
legally frame Tatarstan’s association with Russia. His thesis is that without the treaties 
between the federal center and the regions Russia would be a unitary state25[98]. 
 
Later on, Shaimiev came up with proposal to amend the Russian Constitution in a way that 
would change the rules regulating the formation of electoral districts. The most important 
thing is that Tatarstani authorities are eager to do away with the clause which disallows more 
than 10% difference in terms of population between the electoral districts. The speaker of the 
State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin looks for support from other ethnic republic 
(in particular, Adygeia and Dagestan) that are not satisfied with “ten-per-cent” clause because 
it makes impossible to form electoral districts based on ethnic background26[99]. Ethnic 
electoral districts, as many in Tatarstan deem, might avoid turning political campaigning into 
inter-ethnic clashes, and keep the voters’ choice in the framework of one ethnic group. 
Understanding that this arrangement is a clear departure from democratic procedures, 
Tatarstani political experts concede that this is a precondition for ethnic peace in the 
republic27[100]. In exchange for acceptance of its legislative proposal, Tatarstan is ready to 
negotiate further removing from its Constitution articles on republic’s sovereignty and 
international actorship.  
 
A number of other concessions to the federal center have been made as well. Politically, 
Shaimiev has agreed to introduce bicameral model of the State Council, thus allowing 
opposition forces to get their seats in its lower house28[101]. In fall 2000 he also supported 
Putin in reintroducing the Soviet-era anthem. In the economic area, for the first time in the 
whole decade, 2001 budget of Tatarstan was drafted in accordance to the national tax 
legislation, which led to abolishing of certain local taxes and channeling 60 percent of its 
revenues to the federal budget, as all other regions of Russia. In exchange, the federal 
government has agreed to co-fund some projects that used to be funded out of republican 
means29[102].  
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These facts clearly testify that the political elite basically shows a great deal of soberness and 
moderation, and strategically looks for political settlement of their disagreements with the 
federal center. Starting from fall 2000, Shaimiev prefers to speak about “self-sufficient” (not 
“sovereign”) Tatarstan. “The offices of federal agencies have begun to open in Kazan’, and 
Moscow has reimposed control over tax collection and spending. The introduction of 
teaching using the Latin alphabet has been postponed, with existing projects labeled 
experimental”30[103]. The Communication Board of Tatarstan was rearranged as the federal 
unit31[104]. Some local experts have started discussing conditions of Tatarstan’s entry into 
an enlarged region, should the federal center take this decision32[105]. In Shaimiev’s view, 
there was sufficient space for bargaining with the federal authorities. This strategy of 
accommodation was reinforced by political messages he was receiving from Moscow, 
basically signalizing that President Putin is not intended to unseat Shaimiev. 
 
Tatarstani authorities are looking for political compromises based on assumption that all 
changes in the Constitutions of republics (including Tatarstan) have to be complemented by 
adequate revisions of the federal Constitution33[106]. Yet Tatarstan seems to be unwilling to 
give up its conviction that Russia has to remain asymmetrical federation and needs the 
Chamber of Nationalities as a part of its parliament 34[107]. Shaimiev remain strong 
supporter of keeping the heads of the subjects of federations popularly elected, while in his 
view the heads of the municipal units have to be appointed35[108]. 
Also Tatarstan does not want to give up its reservations concerning the territorial reform. 
Shaimiev is one of the most vociferous critics of the withdrawal of the regional leaders from 
the Council of Federation36[109]. In an attempt to start publicly debating the effectiveness of 
new regional division of Russia, Mentimir Shaimiev had announced the idea of dividing each 
of the federal districts into several territorial entities each comprising 2 or 3 subjects of 
federation. In his opinion, 15 “small regions” within one federal district (the case of VDF) is 
too many. To develop further these ideas, in April 2001 Farid Mukhametshin came up with 
the proposal to officially allow the “donor” regions (those giving to the federal budget more 
that they receive) to have under their financial patronage a number of adjacent weaker 
provinces. These regional groupings centered around several leaders (including Tatarstan 
itself) could be nuclei of future new regional agglomerations in Russia37[110]. 
 
Mintimir Shaimiev is still the political figure the federal authorities have to take probably 
more seriously than most other regional chieftains (President Putin has publicly confessed 
that it was Shaimiev to whom he first offered the post of the head of the VFD38[111]). In 
opinion of Professor Vladimir Razuvaev, “in the light of Taliban successes in Afghanistan 
and possible ‘domino reaction’ all across Central Asia, Moscow treats Shaimiev as a much 
needed leader that could have been used as a barrier to religious extremism and political 
destabilization”39[112]. As a symbol of easing tensions between Tatarstan and 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia40[113], president Shaimiev was appointed the member of the 7-governor presidency 
of the newly created State Council.  In the State Council Mr. Shaimiev chaired the ad-hoc 
group on elaboration of power-sharing in the joint-jurisdiction issues of the Russian 
Federation and the regions. On the whole, the main aim of his project was to further 
redistribute concurrent powers between federal and regional authorities. Yet the Kremlin’s 
reaction to Shaimiev Report to the State Council was quite revealing: it was withdrawn from 
the agenda on a short notice and substituted by another issue41[114], which was an 
indication that the federal center is still unready to discuss these issues in depth. 
 
The good news for Tatarstan was that the federal center found out that there were regional 
laws (like he Tatarstan’s Land Code42[115]) that were either better than the federal ones or 
unique. Sergei Kirienko, the representative of the Russian President in the Volga Federal 
District, has consented that it’s necessary to use regional experience and make amendments 
or adopt new laws on the federal level. This is a good example of the regions’ ability to 
influence the federal policy and law making. 
 
On several occasions, Kirienko has given high appraisals to Tatarstani authorities. In his 
words, one day there will be a monument of Shaimiev built up43[116]. In a conciliatory 
manner he admitted that the tax privileges obtained by Tatarstan from the federal center, were 
properly used for the sake of republic’s economy44[117].  Kirienko praised Tatarstani 
authorities for their understanding of the need to build up “integration chains” with other 
regions in order to be competitive abroad45[118]. He compared Tatarstan with the 
corporation based on strict vertical subordination inside, but competing rather effectively 
with other political and economic actors, using a variety of legitimate means. “I am not 
saying this was the right thing to do; what I am saying is that it worked”, Kirienko has 
stated46[119]. At the same time, Kirienko was quite explicit in terming the Tatarstani 
demand for introducing “nationality” rubric in the new passports as “violation of human 
rights”47[120]: in his view, in a democratic society people are not supposed to indicate their 
ethnic affiliation on a mandatory basis. 
 
Nevertheless, the intellectuals in Tatarstan expressed great concerns regarding President 
Putin’s intentions to subdue the regions48[121]. The very establishment of the federal 
districts was put under question mark, since local experts argued that the federal government 
always possessed of adequate instruments to oversight the regions (courts, Ministry of 
Justice, etc.), and there is no guarantee that Putin’s system would work much better. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3.  
BORDER  CHALLENGES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES:  THE  CASE  OF  ORENBURG 
OBLAST 
 
 
Orenburg oblast is the case of Russia’s border regions. Hence, its main international capital is 
that of trans-border interactions. 
 
Trans-border cooperation is treated by the Council of Europe Convention of 1980 as any joint 
activity undertaken in order to enforce neighbor contacts between communities and territorial 
authorities of two or more parties. In a narrow sense, trans-border cooperation implies 
mutually fruitful linkages between immediate neighbors and is widely viewed internationally 
as the key step toward the integration process.  
 
On the one hand, it performs the role of frontier guards, or barriers that defend Russian 
military, economic and political security. An exclusive neighborhood “marks the limit of the 
milieu, the beginning of an alien area, often conceived as strange and full of perils”49[122] 
which results very often in practical conflicts over the delineation of land claimed by two 
parties. Lack of full-blooded borders converted Orenburg oblast into a paradise for illegal 
immigrants from the neighboring areas. This was a matter of insistent concern from the part 
of Russian security services claiming that the lack of adequate law enforcement mechanisms 
entails all-Russian security problems (illegal border crossing, smuggling, etc.). Regional 
elites are usually forced to solve themselves - with no sufficient aid from Moscow - problems 
of illegal immigration, fortification of borders, security issues, customs regulations, anti-
crime measures. 
 
Yet, as we have said earlier, Orenburg oblast may also play the role of “contact region”, as 
opposed to “border barriers”. Vladimir Zorin, deputy representative of the President in VFD, 
has called Orenburg „Russia‘s bridge between West and East“50[123]. It might be depicted as 
“open border” region, where the function of contact with foreign territories, and not that of 
separation from them, is predominant. This is one of the messages that are quite legible in the 
Foreign Policy Doctrines of the Russian Federation that underlines the importance of trans-
border relations with former USSR republics, including Kazakhstan. 
 
All mentioned above brings us to analysing the case of Orenburg Oblast‘ internationalization 
as a peculiar mix of challenges and oportunities.  
 
 
3.1. Opportunities 
 
The first is that frontier location and geographical vicinity to foreign countries increase the 
possibilities of bargaining with the federal center: requesting additional financial resources in 
compensation for border control, demanding direct access to revenues from customs duties, 
etc.  
 
Second, Orenburg oblast, as other border regions, has a special legislative status on the 
federal level for developing overseas contacts, apart from bilateral agreements. These legal 
acts include trans-border cooperation agreements signed between the government of Russia 
                                                          
 
 
and Kazakhstan (January 1995), Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Kirgizia on basic principles of transborder cooperation, signed in February 
1999, as well as Recommendations of the 8th Session of the Advisory Council of the Subjects 
of the Federation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of trans-border cooperation, 
issued in June 199851[124].  
 
Third, trans-border economic interaction encourages trade and investment relations (e.g., 
“investment corridors”), and (unlike GATT and WTO) does not require the reciprocity52[125]. 
What is also important is that the border regions are subjects of international transit business, 
still underestimated (experts of President Putin’s think tank assume that the transportation 
networks might raise seven or eight times more revenues than at present)53[126]. 
 
Trans-border regionalism in Orenburg oblast gives a good illustration of the changing nature 
of the contemporary borders that stems from two basic processes: one is domestic (the self-
determination of regions in a new international ambit), and the second is external (global 
reshaping of the world geopolitical scene). Both developments lead to growing mobility, 
flexibility and transparency of traditional frontiers. As Chris Brown put it, “the possibility of 
a genuinely global economy clearly raises the issue of ‘borders’ to the top of the agenda – 
hence the notion of a ‘borderless world’ and ‘de-bordering’”54[127]. 
 
 
3.2. Challenges 
 
Yet cross-border cooperation is a very fragile phenomenon in Orenburg oblast. Its 
vulnerability stems from a number of factors. 
 
First, this region is located on the fringes of civilized areas. Kazakhstan considers itself 
culturally different from Russia, which fuels isolationist attitudes from them. Trans-border 
interface is overwhelmed with ethnic, religious and cultural gaps.  
 
Second, Orenburg oblast  – to a greater extent than inland territories of VFD – has to deal 
with immigration. Experts deem that migrants inflow to Orenburg oblast will persist in the 
forthcoming future, and direct contacts with the outside world will further sharpen the 
problem of regional cultural identity, since negative perceptions of migration are also mainly 
cultural. 
 
Third, authorities in the Orenburg oblast have to tackle, on a regular basis, the “dark side” of 
internationalisation – crime, illegal hunting, border-crossing or smuggling (drugs, guns, 
undeclared cash, etc.). As a result, security services in border regions have to perform 
protective functions and shield off those threats stemming from their frontier location.  
 
Fourth, one of the vulnerabilities of the Orenburg oblast stems from its heavy dependence on 
policies of the federal government. Valentin Stepankov, deputy representative of the 
President in VFD, was quite explicit in saying that non-protected border is the cause of illegal 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
migration and religious extremists. In the meanwhile, because of weak border protection 
Russia loses raw materials, food, stolen cars and other contraband items55[128]. 
 
There is a number of most acute border security problems: 
 
 Lack of federal resources for adequately protecting the border. In practice, this is the 
regional administration who provide frontier troops with housing, transportation, 
energy supply, and building or overhauling frontier posts.  
 Substantial increase of the geographical area to be covered by frontier guards. 
According to Vladimir Egorov, Volga Customs director, one of the problems is that 
customs offices are located far away from border-crossing stations. The second 
troubling issue he addressed is the practice of recruiting customs officers among local 
population which increases possibilities for corruption. 
 Weak coordination between customs service, border-guards and railway authorities in 
preventing smuggling and other illegal actions.  
 Ethnic and religious extremism. 
 Uncertainty of Cossacks’ role in regional security arrangements. Before the 1917 
Revolution Cossack units were quite instrumental in keeping order in the most 
dangerous and permeable zones of the state border. The current Russian government 
is not inimical to the revival of Cossack settlements, but they can hardly be 
considered as a substitute to the regular troops. The fears are that regional Cossack 
regiments could become out of control and side up with nationalist forces. 
 
In Orenburg oblast Cossack units are in charge of pre-service training exercises of young 
men, and providing them with material  allowance. In recent years Cossacks have started 
elaborating projects in education, environment, culture, trade and investments.  
 
Ramil Mullaiamov, chief of South-Eastern regional department of the Federal Border 
Service, have said that this agency conducted an experiment with changing regular border-
guarding troops to non-military units, yet it failed to bring positive results56[129]. Generally 
speaking, activities of Cossack units in border territories claiming to play more significant 
role in defending the border is a highly controversial issue. From one hand, the whole set of 
border-related matters can’t be solved without involving local population, including Cossacks 
as its most organized force. The Cossacks have their own - inherited from the past centuries - 
system of inspecting the borderland, which could compliment other security appliances 
(barbed wire, electronic alarm system, etc.). Yet on the other hand,  by law Cossacks (as well 
as other self-ruled groups) are not supposed to participate in protecting the state border. 
Among factors that complicate interaction between the Cossack units and frontier-guards are 
widely spread among Cossacks nationalist and jingoist feelings, numerous complains from 
the local population accusing the Cossacks in extortion, and internal conflicts in the Cossack 
communities57[130]. 
 
Because of all these problems the Orenburg oblast still failed to benefit from the 
opportunities that it has, and get rid of the “periphery complex”, inherited from the past58[131]. 
Foreign investments are still in a deficit in this border region. There is no conceptual clarity 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
whether regional authorities should further strengthen immigration control or open up 
regional markets for foreigners59[132]. 
 
Orenburg case also shows the deficiencies of the federal level policies. As Mikhail Alexseev 
rightly put it, the Russian government has failed to develop a coherent strategy for taking 
advantage of its border territories’ newly found potential for integration into the world 
economy. In its foreign policy concept, Kremlin did not emulate the strategies of devolution, 
subsidiarity, and trans-border regionalism that underwrote successful economic and political 
integration in Europe. Transit corridors and tourism projects have not become strategic 
priority in such potentially gateway regions as Orenburg oblast.  
 
What is more, while discounting the economic benefits of internationalizing Russian 
economy through the “gateway regions”, Moscow amplified  concerns over security 
matters60[133]. Thus, A.Scherbakov, deputy director of the Federal Border Service, gives an 
overextended interpretation of border security paradigm in Russia, referring to topicality and 
urgency of such challenged as “destruction of core political values”, “widening of social 
groups involved in illicit trans-border operations”, uncontrollable outflow of intellectual and 
cultural resources abroad”, and “loss of community solidarity”61[134]. Some commentators 
think that neighboring Kazakhstan is a “translator” of nationalistic feelings to the neighboring 
Russian territories62[135]. 
 
To sum up, Orenburg oblast exemplifies two types of trans-border regionalism, and  two 
different versions of neighborhoods: an exclusive and an inclusive one.  
 
 
 
Part 4. 
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE VOLGA FEDERAL 
DISTRICT: RESULTS AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
The impact of the federal districts on Russia’s external relations might be traced in the 
following ways. First, it is hoped that presidential representatives would have to make heads 
of the subjects of federation more law-obedient in a whole spectrum of issues related to 
foreign economic relations. Secondly, since the concept of the federal districts is aimed at 
concentration of resources, the weakest subjects of the federation will be marginalized and 
will have to leave the sphere of active international relations. Thirdly, there might be more 
interdependency between the subjects of the federation constituting a single federal district in 
a number of specific areas like transportation networks, border security, migration policy, etc. 
In some cases “the larger regions” seek to contribute to peace enforcing and soothe the whole 
bunch of security-related matters. Fourtly, the concept of cultural integration is being put 
forward. Sergey Kirienko, for example, noted that the territorial area of responsibility of 
Russia’s leaders, both national and subnational, is defined not by administrative borders but 
rather by cultural factors (he refers to the “area within which people think and speak 
Russian”63[136]). 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Social exchange theory 
 
External factors influencing domestic transition might be examplified in both ideas and 
institutions. Both might have positive as well as negative consequences for transitory states. 
 
There are different forms of external influence over transitory states: 
 
 influence by consent (the bulk of educational exchanges fall into this 
category). Examples are multiple: the presidential representative in VFD has 
politically supported the four-year project on ”Implementing and 
Dissemination of Successful Models of Reforms in the Cities of VFD”64[137]. 
In Nizhny Novgorod oblast, the Center for Social Adaptation of Military 
Officers was lauchned as a result of Soros Foundation agreement with the 
local governor65[138]. In the city of Dzerzhinsk the trilateral consortium on 
chemical weapons liquidation was established to include the Tacis program, 
the federal Ministry of Economics, and the administration of Nizhny 
Novgorod oblast66[139]. Open Society Institute, with full support of municipal 
and regional authorities, has launched a number of projects such as founding 
of the pioneering in Russia Center “Childhood Without Violence and 
Cruelty”, or opening of the first in Russia Internet Center for blind 
students67[140]. 
 influence by conditionality which is a form of outside pressure (from 
economic to moral one)68[141]. In this sense, foreign aid might be treated as a 
form of “symbolic domination”69[142]. For example, U.S. companies are eager 
to invest into Russian high tech industry (for example, Sarov nuclear center in 
Nizhny Novgorod oblast) provided that: a) local scientists abstain from 
working on upgrading military technologies and producing more sophisticated 
weaponry, and b) non-military merchandise get market success70[143]. By the 
same token, some Russian analysts deem that U.S. non-governmental 
institutions working in Russia actively contribute to achieving American long-
term strategic goals of creating pro-American lobbies in Russian institutions, 
both federal and regional71[144]. 
 
 
Social exchange theory is a good tool to study the communication between: a) international 
donors, b) regional recipients, and c) their opponents. By definition, relations within this 
”triangle” are asymmetric. 
 
We can’t anticipate that international donors’ actions might have immediate effect on the 
regional recipients. There is a difference between ”a highly contingent action” (one which is 
only taken in quick response to an action by another) and ”a less contingent action” (one 
which takes place after a lengthy time span – for example, sending a market consultant to 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian enterprise72[145]). Also important is that longer time horizons lead to less immediate 
contingency: ”an actor with a higher tolerance for risk is likely to be relatively less concerned 
about precise equivalence or immediate contingency than an actor with lower risk-taking 
preference”73[146]. 
 
 
4.2. Cognitive Interaction 
 
Communicable knowledge is expertise that can be transmitted from one institution to another. 
Knowledge transfer is important because it creates incentives for policy changes and invests 
in human capital formation. As Douglas North puts it, the way in which knowledge develops 
influences the perceptions people have about the world and hence influences the costs of 
contracting. People’s perceptions that the structure of rules is fair reduce costs; vice versa, 
their perceptions that the system is unjust raises the costs of contracting74[147].  
 
Competitiveness of regions is determined by their ability to organize learning process. 
Learning is successful if the dominant actors have adjusted their potentials to challenge 
conditions and are better positioned to cope with them. Learning depends on path 
development and accessibility of “tacit knowledge”. 
 
Arthur Benz and Dietrich Furst deem that “organization of regional governance is the 
decisive variable to explain the learning capacity of a region”75[148]. In my view, non-
governmental institutions also have to be taken into account. 
 
The process of learning takes place on several levels: 
 
 cognitive level. Here we find a plethora of actors working with information, ideas, 
orientations and attitudes. 
 political level (“policy transfer”); 
 institutional level where actors communicate with each other and form networks 
(coalitions). 
 
A good illustration of this track is USAID assistance to Russian think tanks. Problems are 
multiple in this domain.  
 
First, it is highly debatable who in Russia has to be supported. Management Systems 
International (MSI) suggests to “make grants only to institutions”. On the one hand, one may 
agree that grants to individuals are unlikely to foster the development of a viable think tank 
industry76[149]. Yet on the other hand, institutional grants usually serve to strengthen the 
administrative elite of the given University, with scarce incentives given to middle-level 
specialists. Clear bias towards making financial commitments to the institutions is a result of 
lobbying efforts of Ministry of Education, which reflects the corporate interests of University 
administrations eager to gain “administrative rent” on working with foreign funds. These are 
mainly University administrations that are not interested in fostering small-group and/or 
individual research.  
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second problematic issue is that in terms of effectiveness, the widely spread practice of 
distributing grant funds beyond open competitions seems to be very controversial. Many 
foreign grant makers are known for disbursing their budgets to a narrow circle of the Russian 
recipients on the basis of existing partnership. Of course, this type of sponsorship might be 
convenient and technically easy, but it provokes a number of negative side effects: 
 
 Russian institutions that are not admitted into a narrow circle of exclusive partners 
treat this scheme as a non-transparent one, and have all reasons to fell themselves 
marginalized and disadvantaged; 
 Criteria of supporting projects are subject to personal relations between a limited 
group of people; 
 The quality of projects resulting from non-competitive procedures tends to decrease 
because their managers are not sufficiently concerned about raising academic 
standards. 
 
Thirdly, international assistance funds are frequently, in fact, in Russian hands. For example, 
foreign grant-making institutions have delegated to the VFD authorities the function of 
working with the applicants to the annual Fair of Social Projects “Togliatti-2002”. The MION 
project (aimed at establishing multiple resource centers in provincial Universities), funded by 
foreign donors, is being formally conducted under the official umbrella of the Ministry of 
Education of the Russian Federation. 
 
It might be argued of course that “host country organizations have a better understanding of 
local conditions and practices”77[150]. It also might be expected that deeper involvement of the 
official structures might eventually give birth to emerging concept of effectiveness that would 
meet the needs of both Russian and foreign actors. Yet the practice of transferring to Russian 
institutions important managerial functions might be a problem, since Russian institutions 
and individuals usually are not free of pre-given perceptions and stereotypes. They might 
have their pre-existing commitments and corporate links. Seemingly, this is a wishful 
thinking to anticipate that “the fact that the program is administered chiefly by Russian 
professionals and staff… serve to strengthen Russian groups”78[151]. It might be the other way 
around: a Russian administrator might select the team based on very personal and subjective 
criteria (such as ideological consonance or affiliation with those structures that are important 
for sustaining corporate interests of the Russian team leader).  
 
The tendency of diminishing the funds allocated for individual grant projects is also 
disturbing. Management Systems International (MSI) report suggests that “competent 
individuals who want to participate in the program can affiliate with a Russian analytical 
group to do so”79[152].  However it must be kept in mind again that Russian academic milieu is 
very corporatist and clan-like, which makes extremely difficult that kind of affiliation which 
is proposed. Invitation to participate in a project is usually made on a very selective yet non-
transparent basis, hence the entry into the field is an extremely difficult task. It is not rare that 
institutions that have succeeded in getting a foreign grant, are not pursuing networking 
strategic in local milieu. Perhaps, one of illustrative examples in Nizhny Novgorod was the 
local Law Institute at the Ministry of Interior which received a U.S. corporate grant (Amerald 
                                                          
 
 
 
Group) for studying corruption practices. All attempts of outside scholars, including the 
author of this paper, to get information on the state of the project, have failed.  
 
Fourthly, by American standards, most regional policy research institutions ”are something 
of a cross between a think tank and a consulting firm”. MSI report has found out that one of 
major inhibitions for Russian ”think tanks” development is that few of them are advocating 
for policy changes. The deeper Russian recipients are to be involved in public actions aimed 
at influencing policy process and opinion makers, the more chances that the foreign grant 
makers will be accused in interfering the domestic affairs. 
 
 
4.3. Criteria of effectiveness 
 
In order to develop the assessing tools, we have to clearly distinguish between two types of 
international projects. The first type comprises those of socio-humanitarian background. 
Criteria to be applied for judging on how effective the efforts of international partnership 
were are value-based: 
 
 social scope of beneficiaries (which groups in the society take advantage of the 
projects); 
 deeper involvement of citizens into community affairs.  
 socio-psychological effects (have the target groups experienced the feelings of greater 
safety and societal security). For example, the Center for Children’s Social 
Rehabilitation was established in 2002 in Nizhny Novgorod with the financial 
assistance of the Danish Red Cross and a number of U.S.-based religious groups80[153]. 
 increased investments in human and intellectual capital81[154]. A group of experts has 
revealed that ”spillovers in higher educated regions are higher than in less educated 
ones”82[155]. 
 changes in functioning of participating institutions. Foreign aid might be a meaningful 
catalist for political change83[156] and foster accountability and transparency of local 
bureaucracies84[157]. It is quite telling that in 2002 the International Financial 
Corporation and the World Bank have launched a new project in Nizhny Novgorod 
aimed at easing of administrative regulations. It is widely recognized that the local 
bureaucracies are major protectionists, favouring local business and disadvantaging 
outsiders by introducing unjustifiable bans, making the businessmen purchase 
additional licenses, or inventing local payments85[158]. Most valuable are those projects 
aimed at modifying the functioning of the least reformed and most red-tape 
institutions. For example, Nizhny Novgorod was the first Russia’s city to become a 
home to experiment aimed at shortening the terms of pre-court detention. The project 
was supported by ”Hope” Institute from New York86[159]. 
 consolidation of democratic practices, including: a) identification and promotion of 
those groups in the society that are prone to forming pluralist liberal principles of 
political order; b) limitation of the roles of radicals in the process of setting the 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regional democratic order87[160]. Of course, exaggerated anticipations might turn 
misplaced: there are no convincing proves that economic aid has clear impact on the 
human rights practices of recipient governments88[161]. Yet what could have been 
achieved is incentives89[162]. 
 
Greater compatibility with international norms. The most illustrative example is local 
enterprises’ voluntary acceptance of worldwide quality standards. In Nizhny Novgorod the 
lead was taken by local Integrated Works of Oil and Fat which was first to introduce the 
international quality control. The major incentive for this and other factories was to get better 
deals with foreign contractors90[163].  
 
 appearance of new ways of receiving and processing information; 
 appearance of new forms of social and cultural self-realization. 
 
What is peculiar in networking resources is that they are indivisible (it can’t be split apart and 
divided among all parties involved) and spread all across the partnership (it can’t be 
exclusively managed by a single participant91[164]). Networking divests the state of its 
formerly unchallenged status of exclusive decision maker, and pushes the state bureaucracy 
to get into dialogue with groups of experts and community leaders92[165]. 
 
Networking is important in coalition building projects. One of examples is creation of 
coalition ”For Alternative Civil Service” encompassing a number of VFD regions (Nizhny 
Novgorod, Ulianovsk, Perm, etc). Emergence of synergetic effect based on appearance of 
gravitation poles of different initiatives in regional communities; and availability of sufficient 
number of highly motivatedcgrant recipients93[166]. 
 
As for commercial and business projects, criteria assessing their relevance have to be 
interest-based and include a different type of indicators: 
 
 possibilities for mobilizing new resources. Thus, ISCRA (Investment Support Centers 
in Russia) program, jointly operated by U.K. and Russia, has launched in Nizhny 
Novgorod a project on increasing enterprises’ profitableness94[167].  
 program’s impact on labour market; 
 stimulation of changes in consumption behaviour; 
 appearance of new services. 
 
Experts of the Moscow-based Centre for Economic and Financial Research have 
discovered a number of correlations that characterize the impact of foreign capital upon the 
regional  business milieu: 
 
 foreign entry into regional markets increases competition, thus forcing domestic firms 
to restructure faster, both improving technological prcesses and corporate 
government; 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 too small a foreign share (below 30%) provides little productivity advantage over 
domestically-owned firms; 
 intervention of local authorities in restructuring of foreign-owned firms can scare off 
investors; 
 small firms, with less than 200 employees, rae negatively affected by the entry of 
foreign firms, while  total factor productivity of firms with 200-1000 workers goes up 
with an increase in the share of foreign presence in the industry95[168]. 
 
The interpretataive problems are however still there. For example, the World Bank study has 
called for elimination of non-tariff protection given to specific regional markets inside 
Russia96[169]. Yet another study has found out that ”multinationals tend to invest into more 
tariff-protected regions, and choose the region with high local degree of market 
monopolization”97[170] (in VFD the most suggestive example would be Tatarstan). 
 
Also very contraversial is World bank report’s suggestion to refrain from creating of ”priority 
sectors or projects” in regional economies98[171]. Formulated in this way, this proposal in fact 
deprives the regional government of economic freedom and ability to maneuver.  
 
 
*** 
 
Thus, effectiveness is an interactive, context-based – and thus highly contested – concept, 
both in Russia and in the West. In Russia, the search for criteria of effectiveness of 
international participation was heavily inhibited by a number of factors. First, Russian 
political class was divided: one part assumed as an axiom that the international cooperation is 
productive and fruitful per se, by definition; while the second group was confident that 
international cooperation is futile. Second, as a result of mass infusion of PR manipulative 
technologies, the edge between effective and ineffective became rubbed off.  
 
In the West, political elite is also divided over this issue. In the opinion of those adhering to 
security paradigm, regionalization brings new problems since sub-national units might enter 
the sphere of security regulations and challenge Russia’s international obligations in different 
disarmament programs. Regions are also accused in being keen to become autonomous arms 
traders. Yet those sharing the imperatives of democracy disagree. They are certain that 
regionalization opens new opportunities for creating policentric and pluralist system of 
governance in Russia. 
 
Taking into account these uncertainties, it is very hard to achieve agreement on the issue of 
effectiveness of international programs. What is certain however is that  importance of purely 
administrative tools is decreasing: for example, there is no way to oblige an enterprise to 
introduce the international quality indicators. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
4.4. What hinders the achievements: 
 
a) Regional NGOs do not meet initial expectations of foreign grant makers because of a 
number of reasons: 
 
 they often lack clear constituency and social audience; 
 the Moscow-based institutions have more opportunities than those coming from the 
regions; 
 regional NGOs tend to pursue individual – not collective – developmental strategies; 
 NGOs struggle with each other for resources; 
 A good deal of foreign resources are misused. For example, this was the case of 
World Bank credit aimed at environmental protection in 1995. Russia’s Accounting 
Chamber has found out that a number of regional administrations (Rostov and 
Yaroslavl oblasts, Ekaterinburg and some others) have mismanaged the foreign funds. 
Experts have also revealed that neither of the Russian official agencies ever thought 
about conducting effectiveness survey of international projects99[172]. 
 
The way the resources are being handled by Russian side proves to be a problem for foreign 
donors. Thus, General Accounting Office has found out that the concerns over well 
publicized allegation of corruption and misappropriations of U.S. food aid commodities is 
quite justifiable. It was stated that “the Foreign Agricultural Service did not adequately 
implement internal controls designed to direct, track, and verify how food aid was delivered 
at the regional level in Russia”100[173]. 
 
b) It is widely believed that “Russia’s problems were aggravated by bad Western 
advice”101[174]. Sarah Henderson deems that foreign aid designed to facilitate the growth of 
civil society in Russian regions has inadvertently had the opposite effect. Rather that 
fostering horizontal networks, small grass-roots initiatives and civic development, foreign aid 
contributed to the emergence of a vertical and isolated (although well-funded) civil 
society102[175]. Ariel Cohen of Heritage Foundation finds that massive inflow of international 
aid “facilitated the delay of much-needed market reforms, hindered deregulation, and allowed 
‘crony’ privatization by financiers closely allied with political leaders, thus minimizing the 
economic efficiency of the reform”103[176]. The same conclusion is shared by Doug Bandow 
of Cato Institute104[177]. 
 
Patrice McMahon, referring to gender agenda, has found that “U.S. NGOs have discouraged, 
rather that encouraged, women’s groups from becoming the voice of the female population or 
an integral part of civil society”105[178]. Russian recipients, in her observations, have failed to 
foster domestic advocacy networks. Their dependence on the international grant makers has 
translated into a lack of accountability, if not interest, in grass-roots constituency building. 
James Richter comes to the conclusion that disproportionate amount of foreign funding in 
Russia’s regions goes to members of the professional classes with a good international 
experience. There is always a danger that these non-governmental elites may capture 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
international assistance for pursuing their own agendas. On the other hand, efforts to ensure 
greater accountability often force local activists spend more energy meeting donors’ demands 
than grass-roots needs106[179]. 
 
c) We expect actors to be most innovative if influenced by developments from outside 
the region. However, if individual actors are externally dependent, their freedom to cooperate 
in regional processes is constrained. 
 
d) Donors’ attention is divided between meeting Russian needs and pleasing domestic 
officials. This ambiguity often leads to unjustified optimism. For example, it is well known 
that the reform of Russian housing sector is one of the hardest issues facing both municipal 
and regional authorities. Most complaints from the residents in urban areas are due to 
disruption of energy and hot water supply, depreciation of old real estate, etc. Surprisingly, 
the report submitted by CARANA Corporation to the USAID Moscow office contains a great 
deal of wishful thinking. It states that the U.S.-supported Russian Housing Sector Reform 
Project “was an extraordinarily successful” and “had a pervasive and profound effect on the 
direction and structure of Russia’s housing and urban development reform. The reform 
achieved would, most likely, not have been as well conceived and legislation certainly would 
not have been as well framed without the HSRP”107[180].  
 
Project assessment is done predominantly in quantitative terms. For example, Samara and 
Novgorod are considered to be friendly to American investments, which makes possible for 
USAID to justify increasing funding for these regions. Yet most academic experts consent 
that “measuring the contribution to system transition in quantitative terms is virtually 
impossible”108[181]. 
 
e) Steven Hook posits that U.S. government has adhered to an election-oriented 
conception of democracy. Peter Stavrakis’ deems that the reform program endorsed by the 
West had a corrosive effect, neglecting or undermining the very infrastructure responsible for 
managing the transition109[182] (the case of Nizhny Novgorod). Alexander Domrin, a scholar 
from the Institute for Legislation Studies and Comparative Law, also accuses the Clinton 
administration policy of almost unconditional supporting the Yeltsin regime and 
marginalizing those political sectors in Russia that are critical to U.S. policies110[183]. Russians 
also tend to overemphasize the importance of “creating the layer of new Russian 
leaders”111[184] and ignore the institutions of democracy. 
 
f) Also the distribution of U.S. aid was significantly related to security and economic 
factors which were more consistent with U.S. self-interest112[185]. 
 
g) International financial institutions, in Peter Stavrakis’ opinion, were hostile to 
substantial decentralization. Their reasoning stemmed from their presumption that 
macroeconomic reforms could have been better implemented by strengthening the powers of 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the central government113[186]. Also, foreign NGOs operating in Russia's regions are very 
rarely involved in public policy debate with their critics. 
 
 
 
Part 5.  
SECURITY  DIMENSION OF REGION'S GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
Globalization has prompted a far-reaching and profound reconceptualization of security 
relations. Security discourse has experienced a shift in focus to a stress on culture, 
civilization, and identity matters; the role of ideas, norms, and values which is to be secured. 
Today it is generally accepted in the West that the concept of security, apart from military 
dimension, has also an economic, a political, a socio-cultural and potentially an ecological 
agendas. Security policy cannot be limited to issues directly linked to the threat and/or the use 
of military force by state actors. Today’s conflicts are often identity-driven and are marked 
by a large degree of emotion and irrationality. The successful prevention and resolution of 
such conflicts depends less on interstate action and more on local conditions, such as 
problems relating to minority rights, human rights, environmental hazards, drug trafficking 
and organized crime. The changing nature of conflict demands more emphasis on the societal 
underpinnings of security114[187]. Hence, the concept of security has changed over time to 
include dimensions other than military strength and conflicts between states. 
 
Thus, globalization has put under question the relevance of the old understanding of security 
as being related to purely military issues. Nowadays security is determined mostly by the 
scale of integration of the country into international institutions and processes, which is the 
challenge for Russian federal and regional elites.  
 
The core problem is that Russia has adopted a neo-realist approach to international relations 
and their security components, which is clearly reflected by the Military Doctrine of 21 April 
2000, and the Foreign Policy Concept of 10 July 2000. The state is currently perceived to be 
the key actor in security issues, which means that sub-federal units are not treated as 
instruments of security-building. There is yet no comprehensive concept of sub-national 
security in Russia’s regions. Security analysis at the regional level is not widely used in 
Russia at all, yet there is growing understanding that security could be tackled regionally. 
This is a clear evidence of the federal center’s neglect of the importance of regional actors in 
the security making process. 
 
Meanwhile, in a globalized world new non-traditional sources of insecurity need to be 
addressed, and Russia has yet to adopt the extended concept of security to include regions as 
important elements of pan-Russian security architecture in order to combat and ameliorate 
current threats. 
 
 
5.1. Federal district level 
 
In Volga Federal District (VFD) the main security impetus is made on dismantling chemical 
weaponry. 5 out of 7 Russian chemical weapon producers and 80% of all chemical weapon 
                                                          
 
 
stocks are located in VFD, mainly in Udmutria, Kirov and Saratov oblasts115[188]. In 2001 
Sergei Kirienko, President’s envoy in VFD, has received the post of the chairman of the State 
Commission on Chemical Disarmament. 
 
Russia has world largest depositories of chemical weapons, totaling about 40 thousand tons. 
In 1997, having introduced the law on chemical disarmament and joined the international 
convention on chemical non-proliferation, Russia pledged to get rid of all its chemical 
arsenals within 10 years. In exchange the Western countries had agreed to finance some of 
the facilities related to practical implementation of chemical disarmament program. To honor 
its international obligations, Russia had to raise RUR 9 billion by 2002, which is far beyond 
expenses that were stipulated in the federal budget116[189]. The problem was exacerbated by 
the United States which had frozen their financial assistance referring to Russia’s inability to 
raise matching funds.  
 
Sergei Kirienko was quick to elevate chemical disarmament issues to the very top of the 
operational agenda of the presidential representative office in VFD. It is still too early to 
speculate whether this problem will be solved more effectively by sub-national (district- and 
region-level) authorities than on federal level. 
 
One of the main constrains is money. On the one hand, Kirienko has promised to rely 
exclusively upon Russian technologies in dismantling chemical weapons production. On the 
other hand, international cooperation is critical for duly implementing the whole program. 
Kirienko has to use every opportunity for fundraising. Thus, he had to address directly the 
Queen of the Netherlands asking her for making financial contribution to chemical weapons 
destruction117[190].  
 
The first facility to reprocess the chemical is to be opened in Gorny (Saratov Oblast)118[191]. 
Again, international contribution plays an important role here. EU TACIS Program has 
funded ecological monitoring project119[192], and all works are being done under permanent 
control of foreign observers120[193]. 
 
Another important challenge is the issue of transporting the chemical materials. According to 
the Russian law, chemical stuff has to be destroyed “on spot”, i.e. at the place where is was 
preserved. Kirienko insists that the chemical weapons might be transported either within 
subjects of federation, or from one subject of federation to another where the technical 
facilities are more adequate121[194]. Since this approach is a departure from the law, Kirienko 
deems that the law has to be amended or altered in as open way as possible122[195]. 
 
The third challenge is safety. In Gorny, for example, there were cases of chemical leakage 
that immediately raised fears among local population123[196].  
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last but not the least, timing is an important issue. Kirienko is certain that Russia will be 
unable to meet the deadline in 2007, and needs an extension to 2012.  
 
 
5.2. Regional level 
 
The regions’ resources could be mustered for implementing Russian foreign policy and 
security objectives. First, regional administrations patronize security infrastructure located in 
their territories. In particular, they: 
 
 Decide on transferring the property of former military installations that were either 
moved from the regions or transformed. Thus, these were Nizhny Novgorod oblast 
authorities that took under their supervision the property of Airborne Division located 
in Istomino and High Artillery School124[197].  
 Initiate upgrading the military institutions. For example, it was the Saratov oblast 
governor Dmitry Aiatskov who cаme up with the idea of establishing – under the 
auspices of Defense Ministry - the Military University in this region125[198].  
 Patronize military installations and bases. Thus, Nizhny Novgorod oblast authorities 
financially help the submarine bearing the name of the city126[199]. In response, the 
naval authorities accept the draftees from the regions they are linked with. Of course, 
securing due financing is a problem. To upgrade of one of warships – “Ochakov” – 
the Nizhny Novgorod oblast administration has come up with the idea of using the 
funds that the federal budget owed to the region127[200]. Even regional enterprises – 
like GAZ car-building factory - patronize military ships and provide training facilities 
and courses for future draftees that are willing to serve in the Black Sea. The city 
districts as well have their say in security issues. In July 2000 the administration of 
Sovetsky city district of Nizhny Novgorod signed an agreement on cooperation with 
the Submarine Division of the Black Sea Fleet Headquarters providing the marines 
with medicaments, food, technical equipment and literature. 
 Grant tax privileges to military enterprises (as implemented in Territorial and 
Industrial Zones in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast)128[201];  
Second, certain regional leaders might be useful as mediators or negotiators (formal or 
informal) in those cases when the Russian government either lacks official instruments or 
wishes to stay behind the scene. Tatarstan was particularly active in internationally 
advertising its peace-keeping initiatives. Rafael Khakim, political advisor to the President of 
Tatarstan, propagated the idea that Tatarstan might represent the interests of the Russian 
Federation in international Islamic organizations129[202] and thus foster security dialogue. The 
President of Tatarstan in 1995 (along with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Harvard University, 
Carnegie Endowment, and IREX) initiated a series of round table discussions called “The 
Hague Initiative” aimed at finding non-violent political solutions to regional conflicts in 
Abkhazia (Georgia), Trans-Dniestria (Moldova), Crimea (Ukraine), and Chechnia130[203]. In 
particular, the principle of “delayed decision” in Chechnia was proposed by the “Hague 
Initiative” and later implemented in the Khasaviurt Agreements signed by Alexander Lebed 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with the rebels in 1996. To maintain politically its presence in the turbulent North Caucasus 
area and act in parallel with foreign NGOs, the President of Tatarstan in February 1995 
established the office of Tatarstan’s representative in Ingushetia on humanitarian issues 
(medical care, food supplies, etc.).  
 
Third, region-based industrial projects might have an impact on the national security as a 
whole. For example, Kakha Bendukidze, an owner of “United Machine Building Plants” 
corporation, pledged to create technological complex of enterprises located in Nizhny 
Novgorod, St.Petersburg, Ekaterinburg and Astrakhan’ strategically aimed at providing 
infrastructure for exploiting and processing oil resources in the Caspian sea. In case of 
implementation this project might give important competitive advantages for Russian 
business and security interests in this area. 
 
In Volga Federal District the pioneers of defense industry enlargement were radio-electronic 
enterprises that in summer 2001 have formed three corporations (“Radar”, “Radiopribor” and 
“ATC”131[204]). Each of them is supposed to get preferential treatment from the federal 
government (their debts will be restructured, and the federal contracts will be secured)132[205]. 
 
Regional industrialists call for concentration of financial and material resources in top-
priority areas of applied science and industry. Kakha Bendukidze assumes that the bulk of 
military enterprises would be unable to build  a few submarines because of the lack of well 
trained personnel technical backwardness. 
 
Quite telling is the situation with those enterprises forming the core of regional military-
industrial complex in Nizhny Novgorod oblast - “Lazurit” and “Krasnoe Sormovo” which 
produced diverse defence equipment, including much-needed - in the aftermath of the 
accident with “Kursk” submarine - rescue submarines “Bester” and “Priz”. Due to lack of 
proper funds, this equipment was not upgraded since mid-1980s and nowadays is not used 
properly133[206]. According to “Lazurit” Director Nikolay Kvasha, the current technical 
possibilities of this enterprise are rather scarce: it will take about 15 years to build the new 
atomic submarine, and from 20 to 22 years to produce from 5 to 7 of them, provided - quite 
hypothetically - that there will be no deficit of federal funding134[207]. “Lenok” rescue 
submarine which was designed by “Lazurit”, constructed in “Krasnoe Sormovo” and sent to 
the North Sea Fleet in 1980s, is out of order because of financial constrains, and can’t be 
recovered135[208]. 
 
Other examples are more promising. OKBM, major producer of atomic reactors located in 
Nizhny Novgorod as well, according to its director Alexander Kiriushin, was able to secure 
sizeable funds due to its contracts with India, China and Iran and create thousands of new 
jobs in Nizhny Novgorod136[209]. Sarov nuclear center had managed to diversify its civic 
output processing diamonds and producing wine137[210]. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fourth, border regions are of special importance for federal security. Lack of full-blooded 
borders converted many of these regions to paradise for illegal immigrants from the Southern 
republics. This was a matter of insistent concern from the part of Russian security services 
claiming that the lack of adequate law enforcement mechanisms entails all-Russian security 
problems (illegal border-crossing, smuggling, etc.). 
 
Valentin Stepankov, deputy representative of the President in the Volga Federal District, was 
quite explicit in saying that non-protected border is the cause of illegal migration and 
religious extremists. In the meanwhile, because of weak border protection Russia loses raw 
materials, food, stolen cars and other contraband items138[211]. 
 
There is a number of most acute border security problems: 
 
Lack of federal resources for adequately protecting the border. In practice, as it was shown 
earlier, these are regional administrations that provide frontier troops with housing, 
transportation, energy supply, and building or overhauling frontier posts.  
Substantial increase of the geographical area to be covered by frontier guards. According to 
Vladimir Egorov, Volga Customs director, one of the problems is that customs offices are 
located far away from border-crossing stations. The second troubling issue he addressed is 
the practice of recruiting customs officers among local population which increases 
possibilities for corruption. 
Weak coordination between customs service, border-guards and railway authorities in 
preventing smuggling and other illegal actions.  
 
 
5.3. International Dimension 
 
Many of security problems have clear international dimensions since they are closely related 
to the processes developed beyond Russia’s borders.  
Regions themselves might become important international security actors. They have their 
say in implementing international disarmament and security control programs. For example, 
one of military installations in charge of destroying SS-18 nuclear missiles is located in 
Surovatikha (Nizhny Novgorod oblast). Yet destroying missiles is not purely military affair. 
The military base is a home to about 5 thousand persons, including officers, soldiers, contract 
employees and dependents, which inevitably raises a number of social issues for regional 
authorities. Ecological concerns are also being heard from the part of the regional 
administration. Commercial issues are important as well, since the metal stuff released from 
the missiles has to be sold to commercial firms from Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod, and the 
revenues used for buying houses for the officers139[212]. 
 
The international changes have touched the so called “closed cities”. US Department of 
Energy in 1998 launched a Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the goal of creating 
commercial job and economic diversification in the ten closed cities that form the core of 
Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to accommodate the loss of employment in this sector of 
military industry. These cities (like Sarov in Nizhny Novgorod oblast) are critical to the 
design, construction, testing, and production of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Their basic 
problem is that their authorities are stuck in isolated communities and do not understand the 
basics of market economy. NCI is serving as a bridge between these cities and industry, and 
                                                          
 
 
facilitating the creation of commercial enterprises by engaging private industry to help 
develop partnership140[213]. 
 
There are some security related projects funded by EU TACIS programs (NIIIS Institute, 
Nizhny Novgorod)141[214]. Bretagne province of France has launched cooperation program 
with Nizhny Novgorod oblast enterprises in military reconversion field142[215].  
 
The foreign assistance to reconversion focuses on training programs for former military 
officers to include: a) firm-based retraining as part of larger projects, and b) retraining 
programs provided by Westerners to teach general business skills. The problem here is that, 
according to the study of Ksenia Gonchar, “Russian industry managers have grown 
suspicious of generic market economy courses, which they find as dull and useless for their 
professional advancement”143[216]. 
 
Regions might take advantage of their commercial relations with those countries that 
internationally are considered as a threat to security. Thus, Chuvashia is expecting to gain 
about $ 6 million from its contracts with Iraq144[217]. OKBM Enterprise (Nizhny Novgorod) 
was contracted by Iran to rebuild and upgrade the equipment for atomic electric 
stations145[218]. 
 
By the same token, in the aftermath of the end of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia 
former governor of Nizhny Novgorod oblast Ivan Skliarov signed decree stipulating creation 
of the task force on participation of NNO enterprises in rebuilding of destroyed oil refineries 
in Novy Sad and Panchevo. Ivan Skliarov had also raised this issue at his talks with the head 
of Russia’s delegation at the European Union Dmitry Likhachov in Brussels146[219]. 
 
Russian regional enterprises might become strong international competitors of foreign 
military producers. Thus, “GAZ” car building factory (Nizhny Novgorod) has designed 
military jeep “Tiger” for United Arab Emirates Army, which is an alternative to US 
“Hummer” land rover earlier purchased by UAE Defense Ministry. 
 
Regional law-enforcement agencies are also going global. In a number of regions (Nizhny 
Novgorod, Tiumen and some others) new security units were established to investigate and 
prevent high-tech crime, including the misuse of Internet logins and accounts147[220]. 
 
 
 
Part 6. 
IMPLICATION  FOR  THE  WEST 
 
 
Apart from Russian domestic troubles, the big problem is that the West lacks a clear strategy 
towards Russia in general and its regions in particular. Many foreign donors seem to have 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“more money than ideas”148[221]. Some experts claim that in many fields of technical 
assistance there is no serious and comprehensive analysis of the work done by foreign 
institutions and its effectiveness. No comprehensive account of failures was accomplished so 
far, mainly because of the fear that such a report might provoke harsh criticism in the West 
and question the basic political and ideological assumptions of Western engagement. Legal 
reform is a telling case in point. Referring to Steven Holmes, “thus far, foreign legal advice to 
Russia has not done that country much good… The assistance community has failed to come 
to grips with the obstacles inhibiting the rule of law in Russia… Ironically, assistance 
programs have been undermining trust building. Typically, donor aid has the effect of peeling 
elites away from serving society by pressuring them to act in the interests of the donor in 
order to secure future funds”149[222]. 
 
As there is no clear strategy, it comes to no surprise that there is also a lack of coordination 
between Western agencies and centers. In the opinion of Marten van Heuven, 
“intergovernmental organizations are poor cousins to bilateral contacts in implementing 
engagement with Russia. The West will continue to face the challenge of having to 
coordinate bilateral and intergovernmental channels to fashion an effective pattern of 
engagement with Russia… Without that, the array of presently available intergovernmental 
venues will only aggravate the lack of clarity as to Western means and objectives”150[223]. 
 
We have to keep in mind that external forces (basically political ones) can sometimes have 
negative effects on democratic institution building. For many Russians, the term 
“globalization” has a negative connotation and is understood as a sort of global “US 
imperialism” against which Russia has to defend herself. At the subnational level, we can 
notice also negative impact in agrarian or border regions (mainly in the southern and far 
eastern parts of Russia), which are more than other regions exposed to foreign influences 
such as illegal migration, drug trafficking or cross-border smuggling. It is no coincidence 
when we find authoritarian and nationalistic regimes in these crisis-racked areas of Russia. 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century it became clear that the whole concept of relations 
between Russia and the West is in crisis and has to be seriously reconsidered. This crisis is 
very observable in the lack of new and fresh ideas concerning the role of non-central actors in 
Russia-West communication. It is very much telling that the 2000 Russia-focused report of 
the Carnegie Endowment “The Program of Renewal” has not a single mention of the US 
policies with regard to the Russia’s regions151[224]. 
 
Seemingly, this is both a political and intellectual problem. The American policy expert 
community seems to loose the sense of direction of the Russian transition and is 
overwhelmingly disoriented by the lack of clear indications of progress in the field of 
regional institution building. Missing or uncertain correlation between the economic 
openness and the state of the regional democracy is also discouraging for those who in the 
beginning of 1990s propagated the theory of quick institutional changes within Russia. Also 
controversial are political profiles of the regional leaders, the bulk of whom could not be 
classified as either democrats or communists. All these are perceptual difficulties, but having 
clear political implications. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
The truth is that the West has had already the same kind of disappointments and frustration in 
tackling other non-Western nations. As William Easterly, the senior adviser of the World 
Bank’s research group puts it, much of the efforts to assist the developed countries have 
failed to attain the desired results. “Sub-Saharan Africa has not emerged from a decades-long 
economic crisis, Asia remains the home of the majority of the world’s poor, Latin America 
has known only erratic and low growth, the Middle East has not converted oil riches into 
sustained development”, he argues152[225]. 
 
Turning globalization into the force that sustains democracy-building in the regions of Russia 
has to be implemented by switching from “cold globalization” paradigm (expert-driven, 
basically technical, and touching mainly financial, managerial and macroeconomic matters) 
to a “warm one” – based on deeper involvement of social institutions, more sensitive to 
societal and humanitarian needs, and focused on grass-roots exchanges among non-
professionals. It is wrong to anticipate that issuing academic recommendations, giving 
“conditional loans” to Russia, and focusing exclusively on industrial modernization will bring 
the country closer to the global world. 
 
It seems that the basic challenge for the Western assistance to Russia is reshaping priorities to 
foster concentration of resources153[226]. Strangely enough, still there were no comprehensive 
measurement of the successes and failures of Western assistance programs, some of which 
were very costly. We think it is time to apply adequate assessment tools to find out in which 
regions and in which areas the international community did achieve positive institutional 
changes, and in which it failed. 
 
Global challenges have exercised some – though rather modest and fragmented – impact over 
Putin’s reforms. One of its most essential incentives was to make Russia more competitive 
internationally through redistribution and rationalisation of resources and rearranging 
political relations. In this sense Putin’s policies are responding to the global challenges. Yet 
basically all those changes are of domestic background, which makes them even more 
durable and sustainable phenomena than those imposed from abroad.  
 
Foreign actors however might take advantages of the new developments in the regions. They 
could benefit from diversification of political resources and appearance of new set of 
autonomous power contenders in the regions. Under the new circumstances there is much 
more space for political bargaining and coalition building for the sake of investment 
promotion, business development and all kind of international projects. There is also more 
room for fighting the corruption in the regions, which is one of basic impediments for greater 
international participation: the more actors operate within the region, the more checks and 
balances unfold, and the more transparent the decision making process might become154[227]. 
 
But these are only chances. The nearest future is to show whether the new opportunities will 
be duly implemented both internationally and domestically.  The reform would fail in the 
long run unless there is clear indication that it stimulates better business conditions, 
strengthens middle class, fosters openness and transparency, and eradicates corruption - all 
what is much needed for smooth and effective international cooperation.  
 
                                                          
 
 
 
Plugging into the global world has to start with domestic changes within regional milieu. 
Living in the global world presupposes greater weight of horizontal, networking relations in 
all spheres of regional life – in politics, economy, and social processes. Administrative efforts 
should complement the non-administrative strategies, but not substitute them. The more 
influential and resourceful are NGOs, the media, private enterprises, professional 
communities, the faster and more effective the integration to the global infrastructure ought to 
proceed. As soon as this happens, the administrative institutions would have to react to these 
changes acknowledging the new roles for networking strategies as a part of region’s global 
agenda.  
 
Based on my analysis, some recommendations could be made. 
 
1.  Foreign institutions should not treat regions (especially as pivotal as those studied in this 
discussion paper) as unitary actors - which is usually the case when it comes to analysis of 
relationship between the center and regions, or between regions themselves. Deeper 
comprehension of region’s international actorship is needed, to include more profound 
look at different intra-regional “agents of globalization” such as industrial enterprises, 
banks, NGOs, media, municipal authorities, and so forth. Each of them pursue individual 
strategies of switching to the global world and therefore should be tackled differently.  
 
2.  Most of the foreign business, financial and commercial institutions operated in VFD face 
the problem of expanding their social horizons. It seems that their sphere of interest is 
overwhelmingly circumscribed by rather narrow professionally oriented circles of 
entrepreneurs, bankers, traders, etc. Unfortunately there are too few examples of effective 
and thoughtful public relations and media strategies implemented by foreign firms and 
companies in VFD. Lack of due publicity and clarity in articulating their strategic goals in 
the region worsens the public perceptions and attitudes towards foreign institutions and 
forms misperceptions of these institutions as exclusive clubs of self-interest, elite-driven 
and reluctant to make social commitments. Foreign actors have to be more explicit about 
their possibilities, explaining their methods, resources and tools as applicable to the 
region. This pro-active PR strategy might help in overcoming negative myths and 
stereotypes about globalization in the region. Foreign journalists and policy analysts could 
more frequently come to VFD and publicly discuss the issues of globalization in wider 
audiences (students, teachers, artists, writers, parties activists, social workers, NGO 
leaders, etc.).  
 
3.  Many of international institutions in VFD do not still use their potential and advantages to 
the full scale. In Nizhny Novgorod, for example, Soros Foundation office, the British 
Council, the American Center in the Linguistic University, Unesco-funded structures, 
Peace Corps branch could switch from merely information units to region-wide cultural 
and social institutions integrating different social and professional interests in various 
fields of regional life (education, environment, volunteering, gender issues, fundraising, 
campaigning, etc.) Potentials of local alumni of numerous international exchange 
programs and the Association of Foreign Residents in Nizhny Novgorod are still 
underestimated and need to be recalled for the sake of bringing new expertise in regional 
reforms.  
 
4.  The road to globalization should not be paved exclusively by regional or municipal 
administrators. To activate the involvement of wider social and professional layers in 
international exchanges and networks, it would be helpful if foreign governments insist on 
including different non-governmental groups in VFD regions’ delegations coming to 
various international forums (presentations, seminars, exhibitions, etc.). This will 
contribute to the process of opening new international perspectives for local NGOs. 
 
5.  Sergey Kirienko as the most liberal and pro-democratic of all heads of the federal districts 
merits international support and special treatment. He is undoubtedly committed to 
reforms aimed at creating business-friendly environment in VFD. Kirienko’s efforts to 
integrate the VFD regions on market principles are worth of all possible intellectual, 
technical, organizational and other forms of international assistance. It is politically 
important to get positive feedback from international community in the initial period of 
creating new institutional structures in the federal district. Such issues as spatial 
development, subnational integration, inter-ethnic relations, borders and security, and 
others might be debated and tackled together by ad-hoc task forces of both local and 
international specialists. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As we have said before, regions have to be identified as the regional actor belonging to both 
vertical and horizontal types of communication. The difference between the two is 
summarized in the table below. 
 
Vertical communication Horizontal communication 
Administrative market of state institutions Networking between equal actors, including non-state ones
Patronage politics Interest groups politics 
“Hard hierarchy” based on administrative connections and 
personal loyalties  
“Soft hierarchies” based on resource potential (chiefly 
economic and informational)  
Existence of the single center of strategic decision making
No single decision making center exists; the rules are 
plurality and diffusion of authority, rivalry between 
competing poles of gravitation 
Subordination of political relations Coordination of political relations 
Strict and highly formalized rules of officialdom Flexible and adaptable frameworks of relations based on emerging agendas (often informal ones) 
Strict borders of the institutional influences No strict borders – all influences are of trans-regional and trans-national reach 
Bureaucratic rivalries of different institutions each eager to 
augment its influence at the expense of others (zero-sum-
game) 
Self-restraining is indispensable condition for effective 
functioning of the system  
Inward-oriented relationship aimed at mustering domestic 
resources 
Outward-oriented relationship fostering 
internationalization and globalization 
 
VFD regions share a sort of “double identity” – it functions in two spheres (the administrative 
and networking ones) simultaneously. This makes us think that the future model of 
federalism in Russia could be described by the formula “administrative strategies plus 
networking”. Three basic obstacles however  might slow down its implementation. 
 
First, the road to the global integration should not be paved exclusively by administrative 
structures. Of course, it is important that the regional administration signs investment 
agreements, takes loans, randomly introduces tax relieves for foreign business wishing to 
operate in the region, and looks for  cooperation with foreign counterparts155[228]. Yet “red 
tape globalization” inevitably faces severe constrains in resources, scope and effects. 
Region’s “administrative market” works extremely ineffective in vital spheres like strategic 
planning, legislative support of business, energy supply, labour relations, fighting corruption, 
and many others.  
 
Second, each time state and non-state actors have to interact, multiple conflicts arise – these 
of communication, decision making and joint management of public issues. Administrative 
structures are very reluctant to share their powers with non-governmental actors. Yet non-
state (networking) actors frequently lack due resources to fully implement their agendas, and 
have to go and pay their respects to administrative decision makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
